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Liebman: The Supreme Court and Exclusions by Racetracks

Articles
THE SUPREME COURT AND EXCLUSIONS BY RACETRACKS
BENNETT LIEBMAN*

"I say race horses are essentially gambling implements, as much as
roulette tables."'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Operating a horse racing track in the early twentieth century
was a fairly simple task. Racetrack owners could basically do
whatever they wished. For no reason in particular, track owners
could exclude any and all patrons, as well as any owner, trainer, or
jockey, directly participating in the day's events. This article will
show why such practices were easy, and expound on the current
legal state of racetrack exclusion. While this article generally refers
to horse racing, the analysis in this article also applies to the other
sports, such as greyhound racing and jai alai, in which legalized
sports gambling is authorized.
Initially, racetrack owners found it fairly easy to exclude others
because the United States Supreme Court made any resort to federal courts, by parties excluded from racetracks, an unthinkable action. The Supreme Court assisted in establishing this concept by
holding that exclusions from racetracks under the common law
were not actionable offenses. In 1913, the United States Supreme
Court in Marrone v. WashingtonJockey Club, through a decision authored by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, established this principal
2
of total management discretion in racetrack exclusions.
* Bennett Liebman is the Executive Director of the Government Law Center
of Albany Law School. He has served as the Coordinator of the Government Law
Center's Program on Racing and Gaming Law since the program's inception in

2002. Mr. Liebman is a summa cum laude graduate of Union College and a cum
laude graduate of New York University School of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge and thank Stanley Bergstein, the executive vice-president of Harness
Tracks of America and Paul Estok, Esq., the counsel of Harness Tracks of America
for allowing him to help develop the analysis and many of the materials used in
this article.
1. See Oliver W. Holmes, THE AUTOCRAT OF THE BREAKFAST TABLE 84 (1858)
(quoting opinion of horse racing).

2. See 227 U.S. 633, 636 (1913) (establishing discretion regarding racetrack
exclusion and failed to change commonly accepted contract rule).
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The decision in Marone almost guaranteed that people excluded from racetracks would not have relief in the federal court
system. It also provided a precedent that was followed in nearly
every state court jurisdiction where there were no rules or legislation on the powers of a racetrack to exclude individuals. While a
number of changes have been instituted over the nearly ten decades since Marrone was decided, much of the basic rule espoused
by Justice Holmes remains unchanged. Where the common law is
unchanged, management at a racetrack can, with certain exceptions, largely do whatever it wishes in determining whether a patron
has access to the racetrack. Individuals who have horse racing licenses may have greater rights; however, in common law states, the
rights of these licensees still remain circumscribed.
This article will review the factual background of Marrone, the
pre-Marroneprecedents involving racetrack exclusions, the decision
in Marrone, and finally the decision's effects on the horse racing
industry. In reviewing the effects of the Marone decision, this article will begin by reviewing the holdings of federal courts issued in
the first fifty years after Marrone. Next, the article will analyze how
the federal courts treated the decision in the years after the civil
rights revolution of the Warren Court. This article also provides
separate reviews for exclusions of racetrack licensees and exclusions
of racetrack patrons. The article concludes with a review of how
state courts have treated the Marrone decision after it was first issued
and how the legal precedents of these state courts have changed in
3
the years since the Warren Court.
II.

WHO WAS JOSEPH MARRONE?

The history of the Marrone case is a microcosm of the issues
involved in excluding people from racetrack property. Primarily,
this issue surrounds the question of whether the owners excluded
an individual because he posed a threat to the propriety and the
integrity of racing or rather removed an individual for strictly personal reasons.
3. One thing that has changed is the site of the exclusion that prompted the
Marronelawsuit. The site of the incident was the Bennings Racetrack, which operated until 1908 in the District of Columbia; Bennings was able to operate because
it was outside the location subject to the ban on District of Columbia gambling.
There has been no horse racing in the District of Columbia since Bennings ceased
operations. See Ch. 497, 26 Stat. 824 (1981) (banning gambling in Washington,
Georgetown, and areas in District of Columbia within one mile of two cities); see
also 154 CONG. REc. H3922-24 (Mar. 25, 2008) (recalling remarks of Thetus Sims).
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The foundation of the case began, on November 23, 1907, after Joseph Marrone entered his horse St. Joseph in the first race at
the Washington D.C. racetrack, Bennings. 4 The horse ran in the
name of Miss A. M. Marrone, Joseph Marrone's daughter. Mr. Marrone was acknowledged as the trainer of the horse. 5 In an era well
before the advent of any scientific drug testing, stewards at the racetrack believed that the horse was acting strangely. The stewards exclaimed "St. Joseph's warm appearance and antics excited their
suspicion." 6 They asked the track veterinarian for his thoughts on
St. Joseph's condition and he told the stewards that the horse "appeared to have been doped."' 7 The stewards did not remove/disqualify the horse from the race; rather, the horse ran and finished
next-to-last in a twelve horse field. Following the race, Mr. Marrone
was suspended from entering any future horses at Bennings, and
his case was referred to the Jockey Club.8 On the following racing
day, Mr. Marrone purchased a ticket as a patron and was ejected
from the track by security officials. 9 On the succeeding day, Mr.
Marrone again returned to Bennings, purchased a ticket of admission, but was again denied entry into the racetrack. 10 The Marrone
exclusion was termed the "sensation of the meeting."'1
4. See Hibiscus Purse Won By Anna Marrone II, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1927 at Si
(showing horses named after family members finished 1-2 in Hibiscus Purse in
Hialeah with Anna Marrone II winning , followed by Joseph Marrone III).
5. See Current Notes of the Turf DAILY RACING FoRM,July 11, 1915 (noting he
allegedly owned race horses since 1885). How Joseph Marrone was able to train
horses while simultaneously conducting his regular business involving garbage
cleaning in the New York City area has never been disclosed in newspaper articles.
6. See Good CardDeserved Better at the Benning Races, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1907
(noting suspicious behavior of horse); see also Right Royal Wins, N.Y. TUB., Nov. 24,
1907 (describing races that day and not mentioning Joseph Marrone).
7. See id. (highlighting veterinarian opinion).
8. See How Can You Pick Em If Owners Don't Know When to Back Entries, WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 1907 (discussing suspension at Bennings). The Jockey Club was
the private organization that established and enforced most of the rules governing
thoroughbred racing. See generally Fink v. Cole, 97 N.E.2d 873 (1951) (stating purpose of Jockey Club). As horse racing in the United States became increasingly
publically regulated, the role of the Jockey Club in the actual promulgation and
enforcement of rules diminished. For example, in NewYork the role of the Jockey
Club in licensing individuals for horse racing was formally terminated. See id.
(eliminating grant of legislative power).
9. See Bookies Weep and Wail, WASH. TIMEs, Nov. 26, 1907 ("Joe Marrone got the
gate yesterday when he presented himself for admission to the track."); see also
Marrone Denied Admission, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1907 (revealing admission denial).
10. See Marrone v. Wash. Jockey Club, No. 2019, 1910 WL 20767, at *1 (D.C.
1910) ("The same officer who had been called on the former occasion led him
away from the entrance into the street.").
11. See Racing, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1907 (describing exclusion).
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At a time Marrone was ejected from the racetrack grounds, the
courts were seldom used to resolve horse racing disputes. Nevertheless, Joseph Marrone wasted no time in suing the Washington
Jockey Club, the owner of Bennings, and the stewards of the racetrack. 12 Marrone's principal argument was that, while he was
known as a heavy bettor, he bet virtually nothing on St. Joseph on
the day the horse was suspected of being doped. Additionally, St.
Joseph often acted in the claimed suspicious manner on his way to
the track. 13 Mr. Marrone stated that the charge of doping "disgraces him in the eyes of thousands of his friends, hurts his character, and affects his business standing."' 14 He also declared:
I'll say what I have to say and won't stop until my name is
cleared until I can resume racing until I choose or stop
[and] nothing will stop me. All the Pinkertons, all the politicians, and all the judges in the world will not stop me. I
5
will give my life to be set right.'
As the lawsuits progressed through the courts, Marrone was finally admitted to the track after paying his two dollar admission fee,
at the tracks last race of the season, the spring Bennings meeting of
1908.16 Marrone was also allowed to enter horses, including St. Joseph, at the spring race. 17 These positive actions, however, did not
deter Marrone from pursuing his suit. He said, "I am going to fight
for vindication and won't stop until I get it."8 Marrone had his
critics and the media was one of the loudest of all. The anti-Italian
12. See, e.g., Marrone v. N.Y. Jockey Club, 17 N.Y.S. 936 (N.Y. Gen. Term.
1892) (holding certain claims of Marrone relevant); and Marrone v. N.Y. Jockey
Club, 14 N.Y.S. 199 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1891) (determining "he fails to set out a
cause of action against anybody" in contract claim).
13. See Says St. Joseph Was Doped, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2007 (detailing horses'
actions); Doped Horses Hard to Tell Wen Fixed to Race, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2007
(portraying doped horses) For more on Marrone's wagering, see Marrone the Star
Benning Winner, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1907; and "Gossip of the Track," WASH. HERALD.,Ap. 13, 1907 (portraying scandal). Also, "Joe Marrone . . . is said to have

cleaned up a small fortune on his horse's victory." See L'Amour Medium of Coup,
WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1907 (stating Marrone "had won $30,000 but it is safe to say
that the amount was not half that much" and brought in "best engineered and
most successful coup of the meeting").
14. See Marrone Threatens the Racing Game in this State, N.Y. EVENING WORLD,
Dec. 7, 1907 (describing effects of allegations).
15. See id. (declaring will to not give up action).
16. See Beliweather Winner of Bennings Handicap, First Stake of Season, N.Y.
WORLD, Mar. 23, 1908 (noting track meeting).
17. See Vincent Treanor, Eyes of Bennings on Racing Bill, N.Y. WORLD, Mar. 31,
1908 (showing horses entered); and Amateur Riders Have Day at Bennings, DAILY
RACING FoRM, Apr. 9, 2008 (entering horses).
18. See id. (highlighting drive for vindication).
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sentiment in the media's treatment of Marrone was not particularly
subtle. Several media outlets recited: He "recites his wrongs in the
broken English used by Italians. "' 1 He "has the dark, flashy eyes of
his race." 20 "He doesn't talk English as well as some of his countrymen." 21 "Not much sympathy will be exerted over Marrone's troubles. He is a type of horsemen who plays the game with sharp tools
22
and if his own fingers are cut, nobody will cry."
In media also highlighted Marrone as possessing a vast fortune,
which had possibly been obtained through illegal means. 23 Some
believed he was the prot~g6 to the Tammany boss "Big Tim" Sullivan and that he had through his contacts with Tammany, obtained
24
his wealth by controlling the City's scow trimming contract.
Others believed that he obtained his fortune by running a majority
of city contracts. 2 5 He was once described as "the owner of all the
dump privileges of the city of New York."2 6 Moreover, in 1906, public scrutiny about his wealth led to a major investigation how of how
he obtained New York City's street cleaning contracts. 27 Despite all
of these assumptions about his vast fortune, there were almost no
28
funds in his estate and he officially died insolvent.

19. See Good Card Deserved Better, supra note 6 (noting anti-Italian remarks).
20. See id. (regarding eyes, highlighting anti-Italian remarks).
21. See id. (concerning speech, noting anti-Italian remarks).
22. See Bookies Weep, supra note 9.
23. See Marrone in Trouble Again, WASH. HERALD, Mar. 22, 1910.
24. See The Brooklyn Dumps, N.Y. TRIB., Mar. 18, 1906. The laborers who were
employed as scow-trimmers tended to be especially low-paid immigrants from Italy.
See Thomas Reppetto, AMERICAN MAFIA: A HISTORY OF ITS RISE TO POWER 19 (2004)
(explaining national origin of scow-trimmers).
25. See H.S. Brown left $322,719, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1929. It was reported in
1932 that Marrone, by salvaging and reselling the paper delivered to the dumps,
"died a millionaire," and "[e]ventually he was an authentic millionaire, not just a
rich man." See Boyden Sparks, Garbage, POPULAR SCIENCE,Jan. 1932, at 126. Being
a New York City contractor arguably placed Marrone in the same league as other
New York City contractors such as the turf patrons, William Collins Whitney, August Belmont, Thomas Fortune Ryan, and Peter Widener; but, the latter individuals helped construct the subways while Marrone cleaned the streets. See id.
26. See Grand Opera on the Bowery, APPLETON'S MAG., Jan. 1907, at 28
27. See, e.g., Ivins to Take Dodging Witness to GrandJury, N.Y. EVENING WORLD,
Apr. 30, 1906; This Is Awful! Marrone Won't Work for City!, N.Y. EVENING WORLD, May
2, 1906; 'DumpKing' Forgets, N.Y. TRIB., May 1, 1906; and Ivins Couldn't Make ContractorAnswer, N.Y TIMES, May 3, 1906.
28. See H. S. Brown, supra note 27.
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A.

THE PRIOR PRECEDENTS

Prior Supreme Court Precedent

Before the early twentieth century, it remained abnormal for
the Supreme Court to rule on cases involving horse racing. Never-

theless the Court heard a case similar to Marrone's, just before the
incident at Bennings. The Supreme Court, in Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, ruled in favor of an individual who was excluded
29
from a racetrack.
Greenberg involved a continual battle between an individual
named Emanuel "Manny" Greenberg and the management of Tanforan Race Track. 30 Greenberg was a patron at Tanforan who produced a publication called the Daily Racing Form. Tanforan
prohibited Greenberg from selling his publication at its track, because the track had an exclusive arrangement with a third party to
sell only their racing guide.3 1 Tanforan's Management feared that
Greenberg's presence at the track would allow him to obtain the
information necessary to produce a similar on-track racing guide
and compete for sales in the open market. 32 Therefore, track management maintained his name in a black book, which it used to
exclude undesirable individuals.3 3 As a result, when Greenberg entered Tanforan, management would order him off the track. 34
Greenberg brought suit against Tanforan claiming damages of
$10,000.35 As the suit progressed, Tanforan claimed that it had the

established precedent to dismiss anyone it desired from the
grounds of the racetrack.3 6 Tanforan argued that its rights "were as
sacred as those of the citizen at his fireside. '3 7 Moreover, Tanforan's counsel argued that:
Greenberg had no more right to enter the track and carry
away information to use for his own benefit than had the
newspaper reporter to force his way into a private reception and against the wish of the host and hostess carry
29. See generally 204 U.S. 359 (1907).

30. See id. Tanforan was a racetrack in San Bruno, California which was utilized at various times as a racing facility from 1899 to 1964. See generally Darold
Fredricks, Tanforan's Race Track History, DAiLYJ., July 6, 2009 (describing history
and noting current shopping mall at location).
31. See Corrigan Has a Blacklist for Enemies, S.F. CALL, Mar. 21, 1900.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
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away the names of the guests and other matters for
38
publication.
Alternatively Greenberg's claims were largely based on a statute passed by the California legislature in 1893. That statute
provided:
[T] hat it shall be unlawful to refuse admission to "any opera-house, theater, melodeon, museum, circus, caravan,
race-course, fair, or other place of public amusement or
entertainment, to any person over the age of twenty-one
years who presents a ticket of admission acquired by
purchase, and who demands admission to such place; provided, that any person under the influence of liquor, or
who is guilty of boisterous conduct, or any person of lewd
or immoral character, may be excluded from any such
39
place of amusement.
Because the racetrack was a place of public amusement, Greenberg's argument was that he could only be excluded if he was under
the influence of liquor, boisterous, or a person of lewd or immoral
character. At the time he was dismissed he fit none of these categories and therefore he argued that Tanforan could not legitimately
exclude him.
Tanforan countered that the 1893 statute did not apply to its
property. If it did apply, then Greenberg's continued efforts to obtain access to the track constituted boisterous conduct. 40 Additionally, Tanforan argued that the 1893 statute, if applicable, deprived
the racetrack of its property rights under the Fourteenth Amend41
ment and under the California Constitution.
After laying out these arguments in the initial trial, the jury
ruled for Greenberg and awarded $3,000 in damages. 4 2 Subsequently, Tanforan appealed the judgment to the California Supreme Court. 43 The Supreme Court responded by upholding the
38. See Jury Rebukes Corriganand His Methods, S.F. CALL, Mar. 23, 1900.
39. See Greenberg v. W. Turf Ass'n, 73 P. 1050, 1050 (Cal. 1903) (citing Cal.
Stat. 1893, p. 220).
40. See Jury Rebukes Corrigan, supra note 38 (noting Greenberg's continuously
active efforts to obtain access to racetrack).
41. See W. Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 362 (1907) (arguing racetrack's rights deprived as result of statute).
42. See Jury Rebukes Corrigan, supra note 38 (describing trial history of
Greenberg).
43. See id.; see alsoJury's Verdict for Greenberg,S.F. CHRON., Mar. 23, 1900 (detailing initial appeal).
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constitutionality of the 1893 statute. 44 The court found that the
statute was a valid exercise of the State's police power because it
held that:
The state has the power to speak in regulating such places
of amusement, and that when it does so speak it is with

absolute authority, and its express law supersedes the
mere whim or pleasure of the proprietor, so that he may
45
no longer exercise his right to revoke a personal license.
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court overruled the
damage award against Tanforan. 46 The court determined that
under the 1893 statute, the excluded person was entitled to one
hundred dollars plus "his actual damages." 47 The court found that
actual damages did not include damages to the plaintiffs business
nor allegations of subsequent deprivations of a plaintiffs right to
enter the place of public amusement. 48 Punitive damages, however, could be awarded to the successful plaintiff, and could be
given "by way of example for the personal indignity and wrong
which have been put upon him."'49 Additionally, the plaintiff was
not foreclosed from introducing evidence of the defendant's wealth
50
to help determine plaintiffs damages.
The 1903 decision by the California Supreme Court did not

stop Greenberg's litigation against Tanforan. 5 1 In 1905, after
Greenberg won a judgment against Tanforan, the California Supreme Court was again on an appeal asked to reconsider the constitutionality of the 1893 statute and its 1903 decision. 52 The court
reaffirmed the constitutionality of the statute, stating that the statute was supported due to the legislature's "fundamental right, when
not acting in contravention to its Constitution or to the Constitu44. See Greenberg, 73 P. at 1050 (rejecting Tanforan's attack on constitutionality of 1893 statute which was titled "An act making it unlawful to refuse admission

to places of amusement").
45. Id. at 1050-51 (discussing regulatory authority of state).
46. See id. (noting that while statute's constitutionality was upheld, California
Supreme Court struck down damage award against Tanforan).
47. Id. at 1052 (addressing provisions of 1893 statute).
48. See id. at 1051 (describing type of damages not includable in plaintiffs
award for violations of 1893 statute).
49. Id. at 1052 (explaining reason for allowing punitive damages).
50. See id. (discussing relevance of defendant's wealth in determining plain-

tiffs damages).
51. See Greenberg v. W. Turf Ass'n, 82 P. 684, 684 (Cal. 1905) (reconsidering
1903 decision).
52. See id. at 685 (reaffirming 1903 decision to uphold statute's

constitutionality).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol17/iss2/7
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tion of the United States, to modify the common law." 53 The court
further stated:
The state, in the exercise of its police power, has the unquestioned right to regulate these places of public amusement, and it is in the exercise of this power, and not at all
as having to do with civil rights, that the act in question
was upheld in 140 Cal. and 73 Pac., and its constitutional54
ity is here again affirmed.
Tanforan appealed this decision to the United States Supreme
Court.5 5 In a decision by Justice Harlan, a unanimous court quickly

dismissed Tanforan's argument. 56 Using language similar to that of
the California Supreme Court, Justice Harlan wrote:
The race course in question being held out as a place of
public entertainment and amusement, is, by the act of the
defendant, so far affected with a public interest that the
State may, in the interest of good order and fair dealing,
require defendant to perform its engagement to the public, and recognize its own tickets of admission in the hands
of persons entitled to claim the benefits of the statute.
That such a regulation violates any right of property secured by the Constitution of the United States cannot, for
a moment, be admitted.

57

As a result of this ruling and the year before Joseph Marrone
was excluded from Billings, the Supreme Court had ruled that a
racetrack was a place of public entertainment affected by the public
interest and a statute that limited racetrack exclusion was not a violation of the United State Constitution. 58 Nevertheless, the Court
left open the question of whether this right extended to an individual in the absence of a state statute. The answer to that question in

53. Id. at 685 (limiting state's legislative authority only if unconstitutional).
54. Id. (asserting state's power to regulate race tracks as public place of
amusement).
55. SeeW. Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907) (appealing 1905 decision to uphold statute's constitutionality).
56. See id. at 363-64 (describing court's decision to dismiss case based on
broad regulatory authority of state).
57. Id. at 364 (affirming California Supreme Court's decision).
58. See id. (asserting Court's approval on statutes limiting racetrack
exclusion).
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determining the right of a racetrack to exclude individuals would
be left to Marrone.59
B.

State Precedent

The primary state case that dealt with exclusions from racetracks, which was decided before the Marrone incident, involved a
notorious gambler named Riley Grannan. 60 Grannan was perhaps
most famous for betting over $62,000 on the horse "Duke of Navarre" against the horse "Domino" in a match race held at the
Gravesend track in Brooklyn in 1894.61 Grannan allegedly stood to
pay out $105,070 had Domino won the race. 62 "It was the largest
bet that Grannan or any other man in America ever made over a
63
single race."

Later, in 1895, Riley Grannan offered two jockeys gifts of $500
each. 64 Grannan claimed that these payments were not bribes, but
59. See 227 U.S. 633, 636 (1913) (reanalyzing constitutionality of statutes
which limited racetrack exclusions).
60. See L.B.YATES, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF

A

RACE HORSE 138 (1919) (discuss-

ing case involving exclusion of Riley Grannan from racetrack); see also

JOHN

DiziKEs, YANKEE DOODLE DANDY: THE LiFE AND TIMES OF TOD SLOAN 53 (2000)

(addressing Riley Grannan's exclusion from racetrack).
61. EDO MCCULLOGH, GOOD OLD CONEY ISLAND, 137-38; Fordham U. Press

(2000) (noting race finished in dead heat); Heavy Bets at the Races, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
14,1895. (discussing Grannan's large bet in 1894 on "Duke of Navarre"). Grannan
could not have been older than 25 at the time of this wager. See id. ("He looks like
a boy, but is one of the shrewdest men on the turf."); see also Luck of a Player, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 26, 1894 (describing gamblers, such as Grannan, winning big bets at
racetracks).
62. See Dead Heat, Said theJudges, No Result in the Domino-Henry of NavarreMatch,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1894, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.
html?res=9507E5DC1131E033A25755C1A96F9C94659ED7CF (asserting Grannan
"backed Henry of Navarre with a volcanic frenzy of eagerness which was amazing");
Domino's Dead Heat, N.Y. DAiLY TRiB., Sept. 16, 1894 (marveling about Grannan's
large bet on Domino); That Was One of the Most Extraordinary Things Ever Known in
the History of the Turf in Our Country, N.Y. DALY TRIB., Sept. 23, 1894; Grannan's
History is an Interesting One, and He is Probably Better Known the World Over as a Heavy
Plunger on Turf Events Than Any Man Ever Before the Public, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1898
(asserting that his wager on Henry of Navarre was said to have reached $150,000);
A Word in Eulogium of Riley Granann,BOURBON NEWS, Apr. 17, 1908 (detailing Grannan's bets at racetrack).
63. Dead Heat, supra note 62. In terms of the Consumer Price Index, a bet of
$60,000 in 1894 would have been the equivalent of a bet of $1.62 million in 2008.
See M2 Money Supply and Consumer Price Index: 1867-2008, U.S. BUDGET AND
ECON. DATA http://home.att.net/-rdavis2/cpi-m2.html
(last visited Feb. 11,
2010) (suggesting that given wagering rules of time, Grannan actually made about
$10,000 on his wagers in match race).
64. See Grannan v. Westchester Racing Ass'n, 153 N.Y. 449, 464 (N.Y. 1897)
(stating that plaintiff gave as present five hundred dollars to licensed jockeys).
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were mere rewards, or tips, for their riding. 65 One jockey, Henry
Griffin, refused the gift, while Fred Taral, the otherjokey, accepted
the $500 gift.66 In 1896, after learning about the gift to Taral, the
stewards of the Westchester Racing Association, which conducted
thoroughbred racing at Morris Park in the Bronx, reprimanded
Taral and made him return the gift. 67 At the same time, the stewards refused to admit Grannan into Morris Park. 68 The formal reason for refusing to admit Grannan was that his gift to Taral was in
violation of the rules of the New York Jockey Club, forbidding anyone other than the owners of the horses from giving jockeys money
and ruling off anyone who did so. 69 Since New York law required a

licensed racecourse to operate under the rules of the Jockey Club,
70
Grannan was in violation of these rules.
As a result, even though Grannan had bought a ticket to enter
Morris Park he was prevented from entering. 7 1 Subsequently, he
sued the track and obtained a temporary injunction allowing him

65. See id. (declaring it reasonable for stewards to conclude Grannan gave

money as "indirect bribe").
66. See Riley Grannan Obtains a Temporary Injunction Against a Jockey Club, N.Y.
Dec. 25, 1896, at 3, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archivefree/pdf?res=9F01 EFDF1 13BEE33A25756C2A9649D94679ED7CF (reporting
jockey's acceptance of gift). Taral was one of the twelve jockeys who were original
members of the thoroughbred racing hall of fame. See Sande in Hall of Fame, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1955, at 29 (discussing first hall of fame class); GrannanExplains
His Gift to Taral,S.F. CHRON., Sept. 30, 1896 (declaring Grannan explained his gift
as complimenting Taral "on his good work in the saddle").
67. See Grannan, 153 N.Y. at 464-65 (noting Associations disapproval of Grannan's gift).
TIMES,

68. See id. (acknowledging Association refused to admit Grannan into racetrack as result of his inappropriate gift to jockeys).
69. See id. at 463-64 (implying there were other reasons afoot).
Jockeys were expressly forbidden to receive presents from any person
other than the owners of the horses they rode, and any person who aided
or abetted in any breach of the orders of the stewards, or who gave, offered or promised, directly or indirectly, any bribe to a jockey might be
ruled off.
Id.
70. See 1895 N.Y. Laws Ch. 570 §6 (outlining rules of racecourse regulations).
"An act for the incorporation of associations for the improvement of the breed of
horses, and to regulate the same, and to establish a State Racing Commission." Id.
71. See Grannan v. Westchester Racing Ass'n, 44 N.Y.S. 790, 792 (App. Div.
1897) (declaring Grannan was denied entrance into racetrack); see also Frank
Clarke's Rule Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1896, at 7, availableat http://query.nytimes.
com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9D03E4D9133BEE33A2575BC1A9669D94
679ED7CF (discussing gatekeepers refusing to admit Grannan to track).
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to enter.7 2 After a hearing, the trial court vacated the injunction. 73
Grannan then appealed to the Appellate Division, and in a lengthy
decision, the unanimous court fully backed Grannan and reinstated
the injunction against Morris Park.7 4 The court found that licensed
horse racing tracks in New York were clothed with a public interest
"in the same category with bridge, ferry, transportation companies
and others, in which the public has rights firmly secured which may
not be denied either to it or to individuals composing it." 5 Such
businesses have no right to continue to deny admittance to individuals who no longer displayed any intention to violate the reasonable rules of the business.7 6 Additionally, in 1895, New York State
passed a civil rights statute which made it:
[T] he absolute right of any citizen who conducts himself
properly, and who complies with the reasonable rules of
the public corporation, to enjoy the benefits secured to
him thereby. It is beyond the power of such an association
to provide by any rule for the permanent exclusion of any
citizen from such place or exclude him from participation
77
in its benefits.
72. See Youngsters Run a Mile, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1896, at 2, availableat http:/
/query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdres=980DEED7133BEE33A2575BC2
A9669D94679ED7CF (describing Grannan showing up at Morris Park track and
being allowed in with injunction); Grannan Saw the Races, BROOK. DAILY EAGLE,
Oct. 28, 1896, at 5, available at http://eagle.brooklynpubliclibrary.org/Repository/
ge tFiles.asp? Style=oliveXLib: LowLevelEn tityToSave GifMSIEBEAGLE&Type=
text/html&Locale=english-skin-custom&Path=BEG/1896/10/28&ChunkNum=I&ID=Ar00504 (noting Grannan admitted to park with injunction).
73. See Grannan, 44 N.Y.S. at 790 (mentioning that Grannan appealed from
order denying Grannan's motion to continue an injunction).
74. See id. at 800 (reversing lower court and reinstating injunction). There
had been a previous decision by a lower court in New York allowing a racing association not to take entries from an individual. See Corrigan v. Coney Island Jockey
Club, 22 N.Y.S. 394, 397 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1893).
It is alleged in the complaint that the defendant has granted to it by the
state the right to make and register bets and sell pools on the result of its
races, and it is argued that this right imposes upon the defendant the
fulfillment of a public duty, and that the acceptance of an entry of a horse
to a race is one of the public duties which the defendant is obliged to
fulfill within reasonable limitations. There is no grant of state aid to the
defendant.
Id.
75. Grannan,44 N.Y.S. at 793-94 (comparing race tracks to common carriers).
76. See id. at 796 ("[Plaintiff] has the legal fight to demand that the condition
of his entrance be determined by [his willingness to now comply with the rules]
and not upon an offense committed prior thereto except as the latter may fairly be
considered as bearing upon his present attitude.").
77. 1895 N.Y. Laws 1042 (entitling all persons within jurisdiction of New York
State to full and equal privileges in places of public amusement). See EditorialArticle 1, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1895, at 4, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
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Furthermore, the court also took a dim view of the reasonableness of Rule 150.78 Because gambling was illegal under the law,
how could a rule purport to regulate a practice that was against the
law. 79 Therefore, the Jockey Club rule was "without force and...
80
utterly void in this respect."
The Morris Park officials appealed the adverse decision to the
New York Court of Appeals. 8 ' In a unanimous decision, the Court
of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and allowed the racetrack to continue to exclude Grannan. 82 Because the questions as
to whether Grannan had proper notice of the hearing before the
Jockey Club or whether Grannan's violation of the Jockey Club's
rules had been established by sufficient evidence, were not certified
for review by the Appellate Division, the court first noted that it
would not decide either issue. 83 Likewise, the court declined to
rule on the legality of a racing association, such as Morris Park, arbi-

abstract.html?res=9FODE3DD 103DE433A2575AC1A9609C94649ED7CF&scp=1 &
sq=Mr.+Malby%92s+new+civil+rights+bill+should+have+been+entitled+&st=P (referring to law as Malby Law after George Malby, speaker of New York State Assembly who helped secure its passage). Its essence is now contained in §40 of the Civil
Rights Law in New York. Equal Rights in Places of Public Accommodation, Resort
or Amusement, N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §40 (McKinney 1945). See id. (declaring that
upon law's passage New York Times editorialized that "Mr. Malby's new civil rights
bill should have been entitled 'An act to enable negroes to blackmail the keepers
of restaurants and hotels."'); see also Negroes and the New Civil Rights Law, BROOK.
DAILY EAGLE, June 21, 1895, at 6, available at http://eagle.brooklynpubliclibrary.
org/Default/Skins/BEagle/Client.asp?Skin=BEagle (stating penalty section of law
opens wide door for blackmail).
78. See Grannan, 44 N.Y.S. at 799 (voiding rule because it regulates illegal
offense).
79. See id. ("Its purpose is plain. It was intended to and had the effect of
regulating an offense against the law, and if the means were provided, or were
knowingly permitted by the association for such purpose, its officers would offend
against the Penal Code.").
80. Id.
81. See Grannan, 47 N.E. at 898 (appealing Court of Appeals decisions and
requesting reversal of their decision).
82. See id. at 901 (reversing appellate division); see also Riley Grannan Defeated,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1897, at 4, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.
html?res=9906E1DB1330E333A25755COA9669D94669ED7CF (detailing events
leading to Court's decision); Riley GrannanDefeated, BROOK. DAILY EAGLE, Oct. 6,
1897, at 6, available at http://eagle.brooklynpubliclibrary.org/Default/Skins/BEagle/Client.asp?Skin=BEagle&AW=1266787485093&AppName=2&GZ=T (noting
Court reinstated injunction against Grannan).
83. See Grannan,47 N.E. at 898 ("Whether the plaintiff had proper notice of
the hearing before the jockey club, or whether his violation of its rules was established by sufficient or competent evidence, are not before this court, as neither of
those questions was certified for its determination.").
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trarily and without reason excluding an individual from its
84
grounds.
This left the court with one question to consider: Could Morris
Park exclude an individual who violated the rules of the Jockey
Club even when such individual had noted his willingness to comply with such rules in the future? 85 The court found that Morris
Park did have this power. 8 6 The law licensing racecourses required
that it operate under the rules of the Jockey Club.8 7 This gave the
rules of the Jockey Club the effect of law, as well as distinguishing
racecourses from institutions that were organized for a public purpose. 88 The rules of the Jockey Club were reasonable, and the fact
that Grannan indicated that he would comply with the rules in the
future was not a sufficient reason for voiding a permanent exclusion.8 9 Finally, the court interpreted the 1895 civil rights law as not
being comparable to an open access to public accommodations law,
but as a law barring discrimination based on race, creed, or color. 90
Because Grannan's exclusion had nothing to do with race or creed,
84. See id. at 899 (reasoning that issue was vague and appellate decision had
been decided on other grounds).
85. See id. at 899.
If correctly understood, its fair purport is whether, under the law, the
decision of the jockey club ruling the plaintiff off the turf for his disobedience of its reasonable rules and regulations, justified the Westchester
Racing Association in excluding him from its grounds when races open to
the public generally were being held, although he at the time tendered
compliance with, and expressed a willingness in the future to conform to,
the rules and regulations of the association, including those of the jockey
club.
Id.
86. See id. at 901 (holding that "the stewards of the club had authority to rule
the plaintiff off the turf').
87. See id. at 899 ("As that statute expressly required every such license to
contain a condition that all running races or running race meetings conducted
thereunder should be subject to the reasonable rules and regulations of the jockey
club....").
88. See id. (noting that Jockey Club's rules drew their authority from civil
rights law of 1895). "Manifestly, under the statute, the Westchester Racing Association and its patrons were as much subject to those rules as they would have been if
incorporated into and actually made a part of the act." Id.
89. See id. at 900 (indicating that Grannan's prior knowledge of rules meant
he should have been aware of possibility of being excluded from club).
90. See id. at 901 (comparing protections of 1895 civil rights law to those of
American Civil Rights Act).
We think the purpose of the statute now under consideration was to declare that no person should be deprived of any of the advantages enumerated, upon the ground of race, creed or color, and that its prohibition
was intended to apply to cases of that character, and to none other.
Id. It should be noted that the New York Court of Appeals gave L. 1895, Ch. 1042
a very narrow construction. The first section of the statute arguably reads broadly
to state categorically that:
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the civil rights statute gave him no additional rights, and therefore,
Morris Park acted properly in excluding him. 9 1
C.

The English Precedents

Nearly on point with the legal issues involved in Marrone was
the case decided in England by the Court of Exchequer, Wood v.
Leadbitter.92 Like the facts in Marrone, Wood involved an individual
who was refused admittance to a horse racing track after purchasing a valid ticket to the event. 93 The Wood court after hearing all

the arguments essentially determined that a ticket to an amusement
94
event gave the purchaser only a revocable license.
The facts of the case presented James Wood as an early 19th
century bookmaker. Wood paid one guinea for his admission to
95
the track and his admission ticket was neither signed nor sealed.
The ticket enabled him to watch the races from the grandstand or
the enclosure. 9 6 Previously the English Jockey Club had removed
Wood from horse racing tracks, for poor behavior. 97 However, The
[A]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this State shall be entitled to the
full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of
and all other places of public
inns, restaurants, hotels, eating-houses ....
accommodation or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all citizens.
1895 N.Y. Laws Ch. 1042 § 1. The second section then applied this provision specifically to race, creed and color. See id. at § 2. The Court of Appeals reading contrasts significantly with the much broader reading that the California Supreme
Court gave the California civil right act in Greenberg v. Western Turf Ass'n., 73 P.
1050, 1052 (Cal. 1903) (allowing plaintiff to recover damages for personal indignities). The New York Court of Appeals would continue to give. civil rights laws narrow readings. See, e.g., People ex rel. Cisco v. Sch. Bd. of Queens, 56 N.E. 81 (N.Y.
1900) (holding separate but equal schools to be constitutional); Burks v. Bosso, 73
N.E. 58 (N.Y. 1905) (holding bootblacking business was not to be interpreted as
place of public accommodation); Woollcott v. Shubert, 111 N.E. 829 (N.Y. 1916)
(allowing theatre owner to permanently ban theatre critic because ban was not
based on race); Gibbs v. Arras Bros., Inc., 118 N.E. 857 (N.Y. 1918) (holding saloon was not place of public accommodation).
91. See Grannan,47 N.E. at 901 (holding that excluding Grannan was consistent with statute).
92. (1845) 153 Eng. Rep. 351 (Exch.).
93. See id. at 352-53 (discussing case background and indicating that Wood's
ticket was for entry to horse racing track).
94. See id. at 353, 360 (upholding trial court decision that ticket was revocable
license allowing defendant to come to track only for certain amount of time).
95. See id. 352-54 (indicating that Wood paid one guinea for his ticket which
allowed him to enter track for specific amount of time).
96. See id. at 353 ("[I]t was understood that [the tickets] entitled the holders
to come into the stand, and the inclosure surrounding it, during every day of the
races, which lasted four days.").
97. See id. at 354 (mentioning 1843 removal of Wood when he was also not
misbehaving).
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English Jockey Club only controlled one track, Newmarket, and did
not control Doncaster. 98 Lord Eglintoun, the steward at Doncaster,
was determined to remove Wood, and had an employee, Leadbitter, an ex-policeman, try to remove Wood from the premises. 99
Wood initially refused to leave, so Leadbitter was forced to remove
him. 100 Wood then sued Leadbitter for unlawful imprisonment
and assault.' 01
At the trial, the judge instructed the jury that the admission
ticket was a license that did not convey any in rem rights to Wood,
and subsequently, the jury ruled for Leadbitter. 10 2 Wood appealed
on the grounds that the judge's instructions were improper. l0 3 In
an opinion by Baron Alderson, the Court of Exchequer affirmed
the trial court's ruling by agreeing that an admission ticket to the
racetrack was a mere license uncoupled with any other rights to the
property.' 0 4 The admission ticket was not sealed or signed, and as
such, Wood's only right was to sue the racecourse for a breach of
05
contract.
The Wood holding experienced a somewhat checkered history
in England. Judges over a period of many years tended to question
it and to distinguish its holding. 10 6 By 1898, it could be said that:
98. A fascinating history of Wood v. Leadbitter can be found at Patrick
Polden, A Day at the Races: Wood v. Leadbitter in Context, 14 J. LEGAL HIST. 28
(1993). The author notes that the Jockey Club could not itself enforce Wood's
banishment from the race track in question, but instead would have to rely on the
actual owners of the track to uphold the ban. See id. at 31.
99. See Wood, 153 Eng. Rep. at 354 (indicating that Lord Eglintoun had
Leadbitter forcibly remove Wood from track after Wood refused to leave). Rule
10.9
100. See id. (noting that plaintiff Wood's recalcitrance to leave caused defendant Leadbitter to use force to remove Wood from racecourse).
101. See id. (stating that action was for false imprisonment and assault).
102. See id. ("[A]ssuming the ticket to have been sold to the plaintiff under
the sanction of Lord Eglintoun, still it was lawful for Lord Eglintoun, without returning the guinea, and without assigning any reason for what he did, to order the
plaintiff to quit the inclosure.").
103. See id. (indicating that new trial was requested due to misdirection of
jury).
104. See id. at 360 (holding according to precedent that ticket was merely
license).
105. See id. (stating that any potential action would be based on breach of
contract). Presumably, that would have entitled Wood to a return of his money
because of the consideration given by him for his admission to the racetrack. See
id.
106. See, e.g.,
Lowe v. Adams, [1901] 2 Ch. 598, 600 (distinguishing Wood and
stating that it was no longer applicable); see also SIR JOHN WILLIAM SALMOND, THE
LAw OF TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE ENGLISH LAw OF LIABILITY FOR CIIL INJURIES 234
(1907), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=5AAOAAAAIAAJ&pg=PP7
&dq=%22since+the+fusion+of+law+and+equity+it+may+be+assumed&source=gbs_
selected-pages&cad=4#v=onepage&q=%22since%20the%20fusion%20of%2Olaw
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The general tenor of remarks made on Wood v. Leadbitter
in subsequent judgments is that the decision is not to be
extended; and that the principle established by the case is
to be so interpreted as to do justice where the person having a license has a substantial interest in property of his
own to be preserved, or where there is something to be
10 7
done by the other party for consideration received.
Finally, in 1915, just two years after the Supreme Court decided MarTone, the holding in Wood was effectively discarded in
Hurst v. Picture Theatres.10 8 Hurst bought a ticket to see a movie, but
the theatre's management forcibly removed him because they alleged that he had not paid. 10 9 The theater argued that, under
Wood, it had the right to remove Hurst, who simply had a revocable
license.1 1 0 The trial court judge opined that Wood was no longer
good law because "a visitor to a theatre who had paid for his seat
had a right to retain his seat so long as the performance lasted,
'
provided he [abided by management's rules]. 111
After the judge
instructed the jury accordingly, Hurst recovered £150 in damages. 11 2 The Court of Appeal upheld the verdict, finding that a
contrary conclusion would be "not only contrary to good sense, but

contrary also to good law" and would "involve[ ] startling results." 113 The court stated that "[i]t is no longer good law to do
such an act as the defendants have done here."1 1 4 The court suggested that with the merger of law and equity under the Judicature
Act of 1873, Wood had to give way to the equitable considerations in

%20and%20equity%20it%20may%20be%20assumed&f=false ("Since the fusion of
law and equity it may be assumed that the rule in Wood v. Leadbitter no longer
applies to licenses which are of such a nature that they are specifically enforceable
and therefore constitute equitable servitudes over the servient land.").
107.

ROBERT CAMPBELL, RULING

CASEs 76 (The University Press 1898), availa-

ble at http://books.google.com/books?id=omcyAAAAAAJ&printsec=frontcover&
source=gbs-navlinks s#v=onepage&q=&f=false.
108. [1915] 1 K.B. 1 (A.C.).
109. See id. at 2 (explaining reason for removal of Hurst from theatre).
110. See id. at 2-3 (stating defendant theatre's reliance on Wood in treating
ticket as revocable license).
111. Id. at 3.
112. See id. (indicating amount of Hurst's damages awarded by jury).
113. Id. at 4-5 (Buckley, L.J.).
114. Id. at 15 (Kennedy, L.J.).
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the current case. 1 5 Thus, while Wood was not technically overruled,
116
its holding had become an anachronism.
Eventually, whatever remained of Wood would be formally terminated in 1948 by Winter Garden Theatre (London) Ltd. v. Millennium
ProductionsLtd"1 7 and in 1952 by Errington v. Errington & Woods.1 18
Nevertheless, while Wood tended to be given a narrow construction
in England, courts throughout America gave extraordinary deference to the case. 1 19
IV.
A.

THE MARRONE DECISION

The Lower Courts in Marrone

The Marrone court, confronted the question left open by the
New York Court of Appeals in Grannan, as no state statute conferred a right of access. 120 In looking for precedent Wood, appeared to involve a similar dispute, but Wood at the time was hardly
viewed as a robust decision in its home country. 12 1 It could be argued that following the reasoning in Wood a racetrack could only
deny admission to individuals who had violated its rules. 22 A court
115. See id. at 9 (Buckley, L.J.) ("The position of matters now is that the Court
is bound under the Judicature Act to give effect to equitable doctrines.").
116. See id. (Buckley, LJ.) (finding that Wood rule does not apply when court
must "give effect to equitable considerations").
117. [1948] A.C. 173 (H.L.). "[S]ince the fusion of law and equity.... [Wood]
... should no longer be regarded as an authority." Id.at 191.
118. [1952] 1 KB. 290 (Denning, LJ.) (C.A.). "Law and equity have been
fused for nearly 80 years, and since 1948 it has been clear that, as a result of the
fusion, a licensor will not be permitted to eject a licensee in breach of a contract to
allow him to remain . . .nor in breach of a promise on which the licensee has
acted, even though he gave no value for it." Id. at 298-99.
119. See Gregory S. Alexander, Reply: The Complex Core of Property, 94 CORNELL
L. REv. 1063, n.18 (2009) ("The common law rule permitting proprietors of businesses open to the public a broad right to exclude developed only later, when
American courts began to adopt the English rule announced in Wood v. Leadbitter."); see also Shubert v. Nixon Amusement Co., 83 A. 369, 369 (NJ. 1912) (citing
Wood as "[t]he leading case on [the] subject" of ticket license disputes involving
ejection of ticket holder); Revocability of Licenses-The Rule of Wood v. Leadbitter, 13
MICH. L. REv. 401, 401 (1915) ("The rule of Wood v. Leadbitter has been almost
uniformly followed by the American courts.").
120. See Grannan v. Westchester Racing Ass'n, 153 N.Y. 449, 459 (N.Y. 1897)
(declining to address "whether a racing association, organized under the law of
1895, can arbitrarily and capriciously, without reason or sufficient excuse, exclude
a person from attending its races who offers to comply with the reasonable rules of
the association").
121. For a further discussion of the subsequent holdings that discounted
Wood, see supra notes 106-119 and accompanying text.
122. See Wood, 153 Eng. Rep. at 360 (citing to instance of denial of admittance
within racetrack); see also Grannan, 153 N.Y. at 463 (citing to second instance of
denial of admittance).
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might also reason that a racetrack like Bennings, which was given
certain public duties and a near monopoly on racing in its area,
might be required to be open to all individuals who were not disturbing the peace or did not pose a security threat. 12 3 In short,
given the public regulation of horse racing, racetracks might be regarded as similar to inns and public carriers, which were required
to admit the general public. 124 Perhaps a racetrack could be found
to require a legitimate business reason to exclude a patron or someone who conducted business at the racetrack. Lingering was the
question of whether a court would determine that a racetrack could
exclude any individual for any reason, or for no reason at all.
When Marrone sued the Washington Jockey Club, the proprietor of Bennings racetrack, and the stewards at the racetrack for
damages of $50,000, he opened this question before the court. 12 5
He argued that the Jockey Club stewards had conspired to ruin his
reputation, but failed to find favor with the trial court. 126 The trial
judge, finding that there had been no conspiracy to damage Marrone, ordered a directed verdict for the defendants. 127 Marrone
appealed from the trial court decision, but fared no better in the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia ("D.C. Circuit").128
The D.C. Circuit found that Marrone lacked evidence to prove that
the stewards at Bennings racetrack had engaged in a conspiracy to
ruin his reputation. 129 The D.C. Circuit ruled that Marrone failed
to offer:
evidence of declarations and acts of the defendants showing, or at least tending to show, a malicious, concerted
movement on their part to have plaintiff wrongfully
charged with 'doping' his horse, in order that an opportu123. Under federal law at the turn of the 20th Century, a horse racing track in
the District of Columbia was to pay a license fee of five dollars per day or twenty
dollars per week. See Act of July 1, 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-218, 32 Stat. 590 (1902)
(indicating required fee for horse tracks enacted in 1902).
124. See generallyJoseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and PrivateProperty, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1283, 1439-43 (1996) (discussing race-

tracks as related to public accommodation law).
125. See Jockey Club Is Sued, WASH. HERALD, Nov. 28, 2007.
126. See Marrone v. Wash. Jockey Club, 35 App. D.C. 82, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1910)

(describing Marrone's allegation of conspiracy against racetrack).
127. See id. at 83 (stating that lower court verdict was directed by judge for
defendants); see also Fails to Prove Conspiracy,WASH. HERALD, Dec. 22, 1908; No Damages for Dope', WASH. TiMFs, Dec. 22, 1908.
128. See Marrone,35 App. D.C. at 89 (detailing court's decision to affirm lower
court); see also Jockey Club Wins Suit, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1910.
129. See Marrone, 35 App. D.C. at 86 (explaining plaintiffs failure to meet
burden of proof to establish case).
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nity might be afforded to have him ruled off the track and
130
prevented from coming upon the grounds.
Likewise, Marrone could not recover from his false imprisonment claim because "no more force was used at the gates in
preventing the plaintiff from entering the grounds than was necessary."'1 3 1 That left the single issue of whether Bennings could exclude Marrone at all. There was no exact American precedent on
this issue, but the court looked to the English precedent in Wood for
persuasive precedent. 13 2 Wood made this a simple decision because
it held that a ticket to an entertainment event was a revocable li13 4
cense.1 3 3 This was the rule that the court elected to follow.
The right given by the purchase of a ticket of admission to
enter such places is a mere license that may be revoked at
the will of the proprietor or his agents .... The law im-

poses no duty upon the proprietor as to whom he shall
give or refuse admission. It presumes that his own interest

will assure proper treatment to those whom he may invite,
by advertisement or otherwise, to his place of entertainment or amusement, but there is no rule for his guidance
13 5
except his own judgment and sense of propriety.
Therefore, the D.C. Circuit determined that the racetrack was
not a utility created for the benefit of the public, which was obliged
to serve everyone, but, rather, it was a private entity similar to that
of theaters, circuses, or private parks where owners were under no
restriction as to whom they chose to admit. 13 6 The court ruled that

the only remedy available to Marrone was a refund equal to his
137
price for admission to Bennings.

130. Id.
131. Id. at 87.
132. See id. (stating Wood has been "generally followed" in United States).
133. See id. (explaining holding in Wood that event tickets are revocable licenses and no damages can be collected for being ejected from events).
134. See id. (describing court's decision to adopt Wood's rule that event tickets
are revocable licenses).
135. Id. at 88.
136. See id. at 87-88 (detailing court's conclusion that racetrack is private entity and owner has control over who to admit, unlike public establishment).
137. See id. at 88 (explaining issue was breach of contract, entitling plaintiff to
amount paid for ticket).
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B.

The Supreme Court Decision in Marrone

The loss at the appellate level did not deter Marrone from appealing to the Supreme Court, and nearly three years after the appellate decision, (and five and a half years after Marrone's
exclusion) the Supreme Court issued its own decision. 13 In a two
paragraph decision authored by Justice Holmes, the Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed the appellate court's decision and
echoed the points made by the D.C. Court of Appeals. 139 There
was no evidence of a conspiracy against Marrone introduced and
no evidence of undue force used against Marrone in expelling him
from the racetrack. 140 On the general right of exclusion, Justice
Holmes cited Wood and wrote, "[w] e see no reason for declining to
follow the commonly accepted rule."1 4 1 He also stated that Marrone's admission ticket did not create any rights in rem. 142 Justice
Holmes, said "[t] he ticket was not a conveyance of an interest in the
race track, not only because it was not under seal, but because by
1 43
common understanding it did not purport to have that effect."'
Marrone's only remedy was to sue for breach of contract. 144 In
short, underJustice Holmes' view and the common law, a racetrack
has an unrestricted right to determine who can be admitted to its
45
grounds.1

138. See Marrone v. Wash. Jockey Club, 227 U.S. 633, 636-37 (1913) (addressing grant of petition for writ of certiorari by Supreme Court after Marrone lost in
appellate court).
139. See id. at 636 (detailing Supreme Court's affirmation of Appellate Court's
decision). For the Court, Justice Holmes opined:
But as no evidence of a conspiracy was introduced, and as no more force
was used than was necessary to prevent the plaintiff from entering upon
the race track, the argument hardly went beyond an attempt to overthrow
the rule commonly accepted in this country from the English cases, and
adopted below, that such tickets do not create a right in rem ....

His

only right was to sue upon the contract for the breach.
Id. (citations omitted).
140. See id. (explaining Court's notation that there was lack of evidence

presented by plaintiff to overcome burden of proving conspiracy).
141. Id.
142. See id. (detailing rights given
racetracks).).

and not to admission tickets to

143. Id.
144. See id. (describing decision of Supreme Court that only breach of contract claim could stand).
145. See id. (expressing Court's determination that "such tickets" do not create right in rem).
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V.

THE EFFECT OF MARRONE

By the time of the Supreme Court decision in Marrone,very few
states had legal horse racing operations. As a result of legislation
passed during the Progressive Era, horse racing had gone from one
of the principal sporting events in the country to a fringe sport conducted basically in Kentucky and Maryland. 146 In 1913, one might
have reasonably anticipated that the Marrone case would have had a
modest impact on what little remained of the sport of horse racing
and the authority of the case weakened by England's quick reversal
of Wood v. Leadbitter.14 7 Nevertheless, that was not the case. The
Progressive Era waned and racing prospered as state governments
adopted pari-mutuel racing as a revenue raising measure, allowing
Marrone to become the basic law for one of the country's most pros148
perous sports.
VI.

THE FEDERAL COURTS AND MARRONE

A. The First Fifty Years
One effect of the Marrone decision was that there was seemingly no ability for a party excluded from a racetrack to seek relief
in the federal courts. With no horse racing in the District of Columbia since the closing of Bennings in 1908, no horse racing cases
could emerge from a federal enclave, and further, the precedent in
Marrone hardly made the federal courts an inviting setting. Before
the 1970s, there were almost no occasions when a person who was
excluded from a racetrack brought suit in federal court. Prior to
1970, there were only two decided cases (apart from Marrone) involving exclusions that originated in the federal court system.
Thus, it is no great surprise that these three cases did not fare well
for the plaintiffs who were seeking admission to the racetrack or
seeking damages for being denied the ability to enter the racetrack.
146. See McGRAw, T.K., HIsToRICAL DICTIONARY OF THE PROGREssIVE ERA,
1890-1920 382 (John D. Buenker & Edward D. Kantowicz eds., Greenwood Press
1988) (illustrating decline of horseracing as sport). In 1897, there were 314 racetracks in the United States; by 1908, that number had dropped to 25. See id.
(describing racetracks in U.S. in 1897); see also WILLIAM H. P. ROBERTSON, THE
HISTORY OF THOROUGHBRED RACING IN AMERICA 196 (Bonanza Books 1964) (outlining history of horseracing in America).
147. See Hurst v. Picture Theatres Ltd., [1915] 1 KB. 1 (1914) (overturning
Wood v. Leadbitter.in England).
148. See Stanley Levey, Racing Now Virtual King of Sports, Topping Baseball in
Gate Appeal; HORSE RACING TOPS BASEBALL AT GATE, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1953
(highlighting that case in which Marrone was premised on has been overruled).
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The first of these cases was Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club.149
Watkins was a patron at Oaklawn Park, as well as the Captain of
150
Detectives of the Hot Springs, Arkansas Police Department.
Based on his ejection from the racetrack, Mr. Watkins - in a manner similar to that of Anthony Marrone - argue that the "conduct
of the defendants constituted a malicious and false arrest of the
plaintiff, false and unlawful imprisonment of him and an unlawful
deprivation of his liberty; that the said unlawful and tortuous conduct of the defendant has caused the plaintiff great embarrassment
15 1
and mental anguish."
What made Mr. Watkins's case somewhat different from the
typical exclusion/ejection cases is that the actual ejection was made
by the local county sheriff and the local county deputy sheriff who
1 52
were working for and being paid by Oaklawn Park management.
While previous plaintiffs had argued the applicability of state civil
right acts, Watkins was the first to argue that because the sheriffs'
officers had performed the ejection, he had been deprived of his
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 3 As such,
Mr. Watkins became an early advocate of applying the federal civil
rights laws against the racetrack and its agents. The officers
through their false imprisonment had violated his rights.
The trial court disagreed with Watkins arguments and directed
a verdict for the defendants.1 5 4 First, citing Marrone, it found that
Oaklawn Park could "exclude from its premises any person with or
without cause."'

55

The fact that Oaklawn held a license from the

149. See Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 86 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Ark. 1949),
affd, 183 F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1950).
150. See id. at 1011 (describing Watkins' position as Captain of Detectives and
patron).
151. Id. at 1009 (listing allegations made by Watkins against Oaklawn, which
were similar to Marrone).
152. See id. at 1008-09 (explaining Watkins was ejected by local law enforcement, which differentiats it from past cases).
153. See Greenberg v. W. Turf Ass'n, 73 P. 1050, 1050 (Cal. 1903) (arguing
based on California Statute). In Suttles v. Hollywood Turf Club, black plaintiffs
successfully sued for the right under the California Civil Rights Act to be admitted
to the Hollywood Park clubhouse. Suttles v. Hollywood Turf Club, 45 Cal. App. 2d
283, 287 (Cal. App. 1941) (describing holding of case that plaintiffs were successful under California Civil Rights Act). Hollywood Park had argued that it could
limit blacks to the grandstand or the general admission section of the racetrack.
See id. at 284 (explaining central argument of defendant's case).
154. See Watkins, 86 F. Supp. at 1009 (citing court's decision to grant directed
verdict for defendants).
155. Id. at 1016 (adopting reasoning from Marrone to determine outcome of
case).
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state of Arkansas did not make Arkansas a state actor. 15 6 Second, it
determined that the officers, rather than working for the county,
were simply agents for Oaklawn Park. 15 7 They were not operating
under color of law, and accordingly, Watkins' constitutional rights
had not been violated. 158 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the decision of the district court, stating that the two officers from
the sheriff's department "were paid for their services by the Jockey
Club and not by the state. They were acting, therefore, only 'in the
ambit of their personal pursuits."1

59

An excluded plaintiff was similarly unsuccessful in federal
court in the case of Martin v. Monmouth ParkJockey Club.160 Robert
Martin was a jockey who resided outside the state of New Jersey
where Monmouth Park was located. 161 While his license had been
suspended by the State of Maryland for improprieties, his license
had been reinstated in both Maryland and New Jersey. 1 62 He argued that under New Jersey law, Monmouth Park, as a quasi-public
entity, could not arbitrarily exclude him and that as state licensee,
he was entitled to use his license at Monmouth Park.' 63 The district
court made short shrift of these arguments, concluding that Monmouth Park was not a public corporation, and nothing in the rules
and statutes of New Jersey contained an inkling of evidence that a
licensee had a right to use that license at a specific track. 1 64 The
court analogized jockey Martin's situation to that of a licensed physician in New Jersey who wished to practice at a particular hospital. 165 Thus, the applicable NewJersey case law did not support the
broad claim of rights for which Martin had advocated, and the deci156. See id. (describing court's decision that license did not equate to state
operation).
157. See id. at 1018 (expressing court's decision that defendants were not act-

ing under color of law).
158. See id. at 1018 (holding no violation of Watkins' constitutional rights).
159. Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 183 F.2d 440, 443 (8th Cir. 1950) (ex-

plaining what is needed to be found in order to determine individuals as state
actors).
160. Martin v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club, 145 F. Supp. 439 (D.N.J. 1956),
aft'd, 242 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1957).
161. See id. at 440 (describing plaintiffs occupation as jockey and residency
outside of New Jersey).
162. See id. at 139 (detailing plaintiffs suspension of license to be jockey and
later reinstatement).
163. See id. at 440 (explaining Martin's argument that he was entitled to exercise his license at Monmouth Park).
164. See id. at 441 (contending that nothing in statutes of NewJersey explicitly
gave licensee right to use license at Monmouth Park).
165. See id. (explaining court's analogy to physician's license to practice).
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sion was unanimously affirmed by the Circuit Court. 166 As a result,
for the first fifty years after Marrone, no federal case had permitted a
person, who was excluded from a racetrack, to regain admission to
67
that racetrack.'
B.

The Warren Court, the Civil Rights Revolution, and
Racing Licensees

The lack of success in bringing federal cases by plaintiffs excluded from racetracks might have continued for an even longer
period of time, were it not for the confluence of a series of Supreme Court decisions expanding individual rights. These major
decisions included Monroe v. Pape, which revitalized the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 as a vehicle for individuals to vindicate Constitutional
claims against State and local governments. 16 For horse racing, a
crucial decision was Barry v. Barchi, finding that Barchi, a licensed
horse trainer, had a protectable interest under the due process
clause. 1 69 As Justice White made clear in his majority decision,
"[a]s a threshold matter, therefore, it is clear that Barchi had a
property interest in his license sufficient to invoke the protection of
' 70
the Due Process Clause."
Finally, the Supreme Court, in a series of cases, expanded
upon the notion of what actions by private entities would be treated
as State actions. In Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority, a private
restaurant, which leased space in a government owned parking facility, refused to serve blacks. 17 1 The Warren Court found this to be
state action under a symbiotic relationship test.1 72 The state had
"insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with Eagle
[the restaurant] that it must be recognized as ajoint participant in
166. See id. (describing court's holding that there was no previous case law
supporting plaintiff's claim and unanimous decision by court).
167. See id. (permitting re-admittance to racetrack after exclusion for first
time in fifty years).
168. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (describing role of Civil Rights
Act as way to bring constitutional claims).
169. See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979) (explaining court's holding that
plaintiff had constitutional claim).
170. Id. at 64. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion similarly stated, "I agree
that appellee's trainer's license clothes him with a constitutionally protected interest of which he cannot be deprived without procedural due process." Id. at 69
(Brennan, J., concurring).
171. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (adding
that restaurant agreed with Delaware to follow any federal, state, and municipal
laws, statutes, and ordinances).
172. See id. at 725-26 (determining outcome based off of particular facts and
circumstances).
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the challenged activity ....,"173 Additionally, in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., where the court rejected the notion that actions by a
regulated utility company constituted State action, the court formulated a "close nexus" test so that "the inquiry must be whether there
is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged

action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be
'174
fairly treated as that of the state itself.

The outcome of these cases was that: (a) an individual licensed
by a State to participate in horse racing now had a protectable interest under the due process clause; (b) these protectable interests
gave a remedy, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against State action which
infringed these rights; and (c) an argument could now be made
that actions by licensed racetracks could now be considered State
action. Thus, if a racetrack is a state actor, it would be depriving
licensees of due process if they were excluded from the racetrack
without sufficient procedural due process rights, such as notice and
a hearing. These cases, however, did not afford any measure of
protection to mere patrons of a racetrack. Patrons do not have state
licenses and therefore do not have due process interests. But for
horse racing licensees, who had been excluded by racetracks, the
promise of possible relief under 42 U.S. §1983 has brought about
numerous law suits, starting in the 1970's.
Initially, a number of cases found that racetracks were state actors. Outcomes that racetracks that had summarily excluded licensees had also violated the civil rights of these licensees were a result
of state licenses, regulations by States of racetracks, the presence of
stewards who judged races based on their powers granted by the
State, and the fact that many racetracks enjoyed near monopoly status in their areas.1 75 These were the first federal cases to ever rule
173. Id. at 725.
174. SeeJackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (applying test
through detailed inquiry because State's involvement may not be obvious).
175. See Puntollillo v. N.H. Racing Comm'n, 390 F. Supp. 231 (D.N.H. 1975)
(claiming that state racing commission interfered with his employment opportunities by discriminating against him because of his national origin); see also Catrone
v. Mass. Racing Comm'n, 404 F. Supp. 765 (D. Mass 1975) vacated on other grounds,
535 F.2d 669 (1st Cir. 1975) (instituting action for alleged violation of civil rights);
Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding
that cancelling of stall privileges without hearing deprived plaintiff of due process); Sims v. Jefferson Downs, Inc., 611 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1980) (alleging violation of constitutional rights in that plaintiff was ejected from state-licensed private
racetrack); Roberts v. Louisiana Downs, Inc.,742 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1984) (seeking
damages and injunctive relief based on violation of Civil Rights Act of 1871). But
seeWhetzler v. Krause, 411 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd, 549 F.2d 797 (3d Cir.
1977) (contending that denial of access to certain race tracks deprived plaintiff of
his constitutional rights); Rahner v. Yonkers Racing Corp. 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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in support of individuals who had been excluded from a racetrack.
These cases did not give additional substantive rights to licensees,
but provided them with civil due process rights. They did not
change the basis upon which racetracks could exclude licensees,
but provided the licensees with procedural due process protections,
such as notice and a hearing, before a licensee could be excluded
from a racetrack.
Nonetheless, the movement towards protection of racing licensees from exclusions under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 came to a quick end
when the Supreme Court, in a series of decisions, made it difficult
to find that an ostensibly private entity engaged in State action.
The Supreme Court began to significantly narrow its definition of
"State action" with Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, Lugarv. Edmondson Oil Co.,
and Blum v. Yaretsky ("Blum Trilogy").176 Under the Blum trilogy,
mere state regulation and state funding of private institutions was
not enough to make a business a state actor. 177 Instead, the state
has to be responsible for compelling or influencing the Constitutional violation. 178 Blum in particular has established that an extensively regulated yet privately owned enterprise providing unique
179
services does not fall within the scope of Burton.
The Supreme Court's most recent major decision on State action came in the 2001 case, Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Association. 8 0 In Brentwood, the Court largely expanded and reformulated the Burton test for determining a State
action.18 1 The Court found that a high school interscholastic ath15850 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Gilmour v. N.Y. State Racing and Wagering Bd., 405 F.
Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (challenging termination by raceway).
176. See generally Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (exemplifying Supreme Court's narrowing view on what is considered state action); Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (presenting situation where action by former teachers was not state action); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (finding that petitioner was deprived of property through state action but did not
present valid claims).
177. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004 ("The mere fact that a business is subject to
state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
178. See id. (explaining that State must be responsible for specific conduct of
private actor).

179. See id. at 1011 ("As we have previously held, privately owned enterprises
providing services that the State would not necessarily provide, even though they
are extensively regulated, do not fall within the ambit of Burton.").
180. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S.
288, 290 (2001) ("[W]hether a statewide association incorporated to regulate interscholastic athletic competition among public and private secondary schools may

be regarded as engaging in state action.").
181. See generally id. (expanding and reformulating test for State action).
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letic association, eighty-four percent of whose members were public
schools, was a state actor.1 82 In its decision, the Court reviewed the
factors it would consider in its State action analysis as follows:
[A] challenged activity may be state action when it results
from the State's exercise of 'coercive power,' when the
State provides 'significant encouragement, either overt or
covert,' or when a private actor operates as a 'willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.' We
have treated a nominally private entity as a state actor
when it is controlled by an 'agency of the State,' when it
has been delegated a public function by the State, when it
is 'entwined with governmental policies' or when govern18 3
ment is 'entwined in [its] management or control.'
As a practical matter, the Supreme Court only expanded the
notion of government entanglement by finding that a state athletic
association, overwhelmingly dominated by public schools, was a
state actor. 18 4 The other tests were not altered, and the years since
Brentwood have not seen any expansion of the State action doctrine.
C.

Licensees and Racetracks as State Actors Under the New
Supreme Court Formulation of State Action

Since the advent of the Blum trilogy, the only time courts have
found a racetrack to be a state actor has been when a state agency
was actually operating the racetrack. 18 5 For example, a New Jersey
district court found the Meadowlands Racetrack to be a state actor
because it was operated by a public benefit corporation. 186 Similarly, a federal court decided that the former New York Racing Association was a state actor because its entire financial bottom line
went to the State. 187 Additionally, in Sims v. Jefferson Downs Racing
182. See id. (explaining that case's holding expanded applicable legal tests).
183. Id. at 296 (citations omitted) (showing that character of legal entities is
determined not by its expressly private characterization in statutory law).
184. See id. at 291 ("We hold that the association's regulatory activity may and
should be treated as state action owing to the pervasive entwinement of state
school officials in the structure of the association, there being no offsetting reason
to see the association's acts in any other way.").
185. See Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1322 (2d Cir. 1995)
("Because Meadowlands is run by a state agency, the New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority (Sports Authority), there was no dispute as to whether the banning
constituted state action.").
186. See id. (holding Meadowlands was acting under state by looking at specific facts of case).
187. See Stevens v. New York Racing Ass'n, 665 F. Supp. 164, 172 (E.D.N.Y.
1987) (finding state actor in Racing Association). The court stated, "In a real
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Association, the court held that exclusion from a racetrack had to
involve State action because a racetrack, acting by itself, had no
power to exclude licensees. 188
However, courts more frequently will hold that racetracks are
not state actors. In Murphy v. New York Racing Association, a court
employing the Blum standard found that NYRA was no longer a
state actor. 18 9 Although the Third circuit once held that Dover
Downs racetrack was a State actor, it has since found, under Supreme Court precedent, that a closely regulated racetrack/racing is
not a state actor. 190 Therefore, in the absence of a specific fact situation where a racetrack working in cooperation with government
authorities bars an individual from the racetrack, it is unlikely that a
racetrack will be subject to a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.191 Courts
have refused to find that the close regulation of horse racing by the
state would create a close enough nexus to the government to rise
to the level of State action. Other federal cases holding that race
tracks are not state actors include Hadges, Heflin, Murphy, Guzowski,
and Crissman.192 Additionally, state courts in Iowa and Minnesota
have determined that the racetracks in their states were not state
19 3
actors.
sense, defendant is merely a conduit through which money passes from the betting
public to the state's coffers." Id.
188. See Sims v. Jefferson Downs Racing Ass'n, 778 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1985)
(holding racetrack had no power to exclude licensees and was therefore State actor); see also Sims v. Jefferson Downs, Inc., 611 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1980) (claiming
violation of constitutional rights in that plaintiff was ejected from state licensed
private racetrack).
189. SeeMurphy v. NewYork Racing Ass'n, 76 F. Supp. 2d 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(holding NYRA was not state actor).
190. See Crissman v. Dover Downs Entm't, 289 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2002), cert
denied 537 U.S. 886 (2002) (alleging that corporation's exclusion of trainers from
facility violated trainers' due process rights). The Third Circuit once took the position that Dover Downs, a harness track in Delaware, was a State actor. See id.
That decision was based in part on the fact that not only was the harness racetrack
closely regulated, but also because that racetrack functioned as one of the three
video lottery agents of the state of Delaware. See id.
191. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (emphasizing that
this would be akin to joint activity example given in Brentwood case).
192. See Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1322 (holding owner's
exclusion of driver did not constitute state action for section 1983 purposes); see
also Heflin v. Ky. State Racing Comm'n, 701 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that
section 1983 action could not be maintained); Murphy, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 489 (analyzing case which held that association's regulatory enforcement action was state
action for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment); Guzowski v. Hartman, 969 F.2d
211 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1053 (1993) (alleging antitrust violations); Crissman, 289 F.3d at 231 (alleging due process rights violations).
193. See Green v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 713 N.W. 2d 234 (Iowa 2006)
(holding no state actor when racing association denied access to jockeys due to
investigation); see also In re Exclusion of Molnar from Canterbury Park, 720 N.W.
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Because racetracks are generally not considered state actors,
the Marronedecision still stands tall. 194 While licensees may enjoy a
property right that is protected from due process violations, it can
only be protected from racetracks that are actually government
agencies, and in only those instances where government officials
jointly work with racetracks in engaging in an exclusion. 195 As a
result, there really is no general federal right for horse racing licensees to be admitted to racetracks.
D.

Federal Courts and Patrons at Racetracks

Patrons at racetracks are entitled to even fewer federally protected rights than racing licensees. Patrons do not hold a general
federal right to entrance at public events and do not hold a protectable property or liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. 196 Perhaps the most interesting of these patron exclusion
cases is Zizkis v. Kowalski. a97 Zizkis was a frequent gambler and
placed bets as a patron at ajai alai fronton in Connecticut.19 8 He
was then excluded from the fronton by the its owner and Zizkis
brought suit against the fronton alleging a civil rights violation
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.199 The court found that Zizkis had no federal constitutional rights including a First Amendment right to
gamble, nor any rights that were protectable under Connecticut
law.200

Even if a gambling facility is operated by a government agency,
a patron still has no right to admission. In Morris v. Off Track Betting
2d 604 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding decision of privately owned corporation,
licensed to conduct live racing, to exclude him permanently from its card club).

194. For a further discussion of racetracks as State actors, see supra notes 17886 and accompanying text.
195. For a further discussion on when due process may protect property
rights see supra notes 178-86 and accompanying test.
196. See Zizkis v. Kowalski, 726 F. Supp. 902, 910 (D. Conn, 1989) ("Connecticut law creates no right of admission tojai-alai, no right not to be ejected, [and] no
property right of which Ziskis was deprived .... ."). The court agreed with a similar
Sixth Circuit case which held that a patron has no property interest in attending
races, and that no federal law created a general right to attend. See id. (citing
Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736 (6th Cir. 1980)).
197. See generally id. (finding that Ziskis was barred after cashing out winning
ticket).
198. See id. (explaining facts of case leading up to plaintiff being barred).
199. See id. (describing plaintiffs claim for being barred permanently).
200. Id. at 911 (finding of court that First Amendment does not protect right
to gamble). See Allendale Leasing, Inc. v. Stone, 614 F. Supp. 1440, 1454 (D.R.I.
1985) ("Indeed, in many states gambling is forbidden by the State Constitution.");
See generally 54 C.J.S. 860, n.3 ("It has never been seriously contended that such
state constitutional provisions impair federally protected First Amendment

rights.").
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Corp., a patron at a state-run off-track betting facility sued to protest
his exclusion from the gambling facility.201 While it was conceded
that an off-track betting corporation in New York was acting under
color of state law in its exclusion, the patron simply had no constitu20 2
tional rights that had been violated.
In Brooks v. Chicago Downs Association, one of the more intriguing decisions on patron exclusion, the Seventh Circuit questioned
the traditional rule on exclusions. 20 3 There the racetrack excluded
out-of-state gamblers who wanted to place large wagers on the
track's more exotic bets.

20 4

The court stated:

As a policy matter, it is arguably unfair to allow a place of
amusement to exclude for any reason or no reason, and to
be free of accountability, except in cases of obvious discrimination. In this case, the general public is not only
invited but, through advertising, is encouraged to come to
the race track and wager on the races' outcome. But the
common law allows the racetrack to exclude patrons, no
matter if they come from near or far, or in reasonable reli20 5
ance on representations of accessibility.
Nonetheless, the court was convinced that under the common
law and the law of Illinois that there was no public right to enter a
racetrack, claiming "the common law rule, relic though it may be,
still controls." 20 6 Not only was there no general right of patron access but "proprietors of amusement facilities, whose very survival
depends on bringing the public into their place of amusement, are
reasonable people who usually do not exclude their customers unless they have a reason to do so."207 As such, the court found no

201. See Morris v. Off-Track Betting Corp., No. 92-CV-0320E(M), 1994 WL
721374, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting exclusion after patron threatened custodian for potentially causing his sneezing).
202. See id. at *3-4 (rejecting argument that any constitutional right had been
violated).
203. See Brooks v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, Inc., 791 F.2d 512, 513 (7th Cir.
1986) (dealing with bet that was not allowed to be made by group after they won
$600,000).
204. See id. at 513-14 (explaining plaintiffs were attempting to place super
bets, which one must select first two finishers of fifth and sixth races and first three
finishers of seventh race).
205. Id. at 518.
206. Id. at 519.
207. Id. at 517.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010

31

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 7

452

VILLANOVA SPORTS

& ENT. LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17: p. 421

broad policy reason to alter the common right of patron
20 8
exclusion.
Other federal cases have agreed with the traditional Marrone
reasoning. 20 9 In short, "the cases generally recite the rule that innkeepers and common carriers have duties to serve the public and
that other businesses have no such duties."2 10 Therefore, Marrone is
certainly still thriving in the patron exclusion cases in the federal
courts.
E.

The State Courts And MARRONE: THE FIRST FirIv YEARS

Marrone went unchallenged as state law in American racing until after World War II. In 1945, the management of Aqueduct Racetrack in Queens, New York banned a man it believed was "Owney"
Madden from entering the racetrack.2 1 1 Owney Madden had allegedly been named as Frank Costello's bookmaker, and Frank Costello was regarded as "the leading mobster in the city." 212 "Owney"

was one of the more infamous gangland figures of the 20th century.21 3 Known generally as "The Killer," Owney's diversified criminal enterprises had by the early 1930's garnered him a reputation as
"the chief racketeer in New York City."' 2 14 To avoid much of this
208. See id. at 518 (reasoning that no policy urged alteration of common right
of patron exclusion).
209. See generally Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736 (6th
Cir. 1980); Payne v. Fontenot, 925 F. Supp. 414 (M.D. La. 1995).
210. Joseph William Singer, No Right To Exclude: Public Accommodations And
PrivateProperty, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1283, 1439 (1996). See generally Perry Z. Binder,
Arbitrary Exclusions of "Undesirable" Racetrack and Casino Patrons: The Courts' Illusory
Perception of Common Law Public/Private Distinctions, 32 BuFF. L. REv. 699 (1983)
(noting public duty of entry only extends to innkeepers).
211. See Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, Inc., 296 N.Y. 249, 253
(1947) (describing defendant prevented plaintiff from entering racetrack).
212. See id. (explaining Owney Madden was believed to be Frank Costello's
bookkeeper); see also Frank S. Adams, Costello Boasts of Aiding Kennedy to Win Leadership, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1943 (stating that Costello mentioned "Coley" Madden in
his testimony while Court of Appeals said that Costello had actually named
"Owney" Madden). See generally Earl Johnson, Jr., Organized Crime: Challenge to the
American Legal System, 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 399, 413 (1962)
(defining Madden's relationship with Costello as bookkeeper); LEONARD KATZ, UNcLE FRANK, THE BIOGRAPHY OF FRANK COSTELLO, Drake (1973); GEORGE WOLF AND

Hodder
& Stoughton (1975). At a time when Aqueduct was barring individuals that had
gambling contacts with Costello, the major New York harness track at the time,
Roosevelt Raceway, actually hired Costello to limit bookmaking at its track. See
James A. Hagerty, Costello's Power in Politics, Crime Shown at Hearing,N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
13, 1951.
213. See VIRGIL W. PETERSON, THE MOB 187 (Green Hill Publishers 1983)
(describing Owney Madden's reputation).
214. See id. (clarifying Madden's reputation as chief racketeer).

JOSEPH DIMONA, FRANK COSTELLO: PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNDERWORLD,
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notoriety and the accompanying legal scrutiny, Owney in 1935 "settled permanently in Hot Springs, Arkansas, where he became a
2 15
powerful gambling boss who enjoyed solid political backing.
His gaming business "was highly profitable and for decades served
as a sanctuary for underworld leaders from all parts of the nation." 2 16 Nonetheless, the man barred from entering Aqueduct was
not, in fact, "Owney" but another Madden: Coleman "Coley"
217

Madden.

The court of appeals described "Coley" as "aself-styled 'patron
of the races.' " 2 18 The trial court in the case had found him to be "a
citizen of good repute and standing." 219 Yet, "Coley" Madden was
not a mere racing fan enjoying a day at the races. In fact, "Coley"
Madden was a prominent figure around the New York racetracks
during the era in New York State where bookmaking, as long as it
220
was conducted at the racetracks, was not a criminal offense.
22 1
Newsweek once called him "a young pricemaker about town."
Madden was additionally described as "[h] aving taken every course
in mathematics available at Columbia University, and sometimes
lectured to the students on aspects of lightning calculation, Mr.
Madden was invaluable to the whole bookmaking ring as a price
fixer." 222 "Coley" Madden was a very well known bookmaker at the

New York tracks when bookmaking was considered more of a colorful profession than a crime. 223 It is hard to understand how anyone
remotely connected with the racetrack could confuse "Owney"
"The Killer" Madden with Columbia's "Coley" Madden. Nonethe215. See id. (noting Madden's move to Arkansas).
216. Id. at 203.
217. See Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, Inc., 296 N.Y. 249, 254
(1947) (explaining Coley Madden was mistaken by defendants for Owney
Madden).
218. Id. at 253.
219. See id. (finding Madden's character allowed him cause of action and this
court thereby entered that defendant be enjoined from keeping plaintiff off this
race track).
220. See People ex rel. Shane v. Gittens, 78 Misc. 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1912), aff'd
155 A.D. 921 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1913) (noting legality of bookmaking in
New York at time).
221. John Lardner, Hail and Farewell,NEWSWEEK, Nov. 20, 1939 at 41.
222. Id.
223. See Red Smith, In the Bookies Hall of Fame, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1976
(describing bookmaking as profession); see also Red Smith, Lunch In a Picture Gallery, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1976 (stating that columnist Ed Sullivan said Coley Madden won one of largest racing bets in horse racing history). "Coley Madden, one
of the most unusual characters at the major tracks, won $120,000 on a horse
named St. John at Empire City." Ed Sullivan, Looking at Hollywood, CHI. TRI., Feb.
24, 1938.
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less, the court in the case assumed that the racetrack acted in error
and barred "Coley" when it had intended to bar "Owney. "224
Coley sued Aqueduct, and the trial court ruled for Coley and
enjoined Aqueduct management from barring him from the racetrack. 225 The appellate court found that the common law rule still
governed, explaining that "the common-law right of the racecourse
proprietor to choose his patrons has not been nullified by implication merely because the State rigidly supervises his activities, re226
quires licenses and taxes receipts from racing and from betting."
On appeal, the court of appeals agreed with the Appellate Division and allowed Aqueduct to bar "Coley" Madden. 2 27 Judge Fuld,
in a unanimous opinion, recognized that Madden compelled the
court to decide the question left open in the Grannancase: whether
a racetrack can ban a person from its facility for a bad reason or no
reason at all. 228 The court found that the common law under Mar-

rone still prevailed, and unless the common law had been altered by
statutory enactment, Aqueduct had the right to bar "Coley"
229
Madden.
"Coley" Madden argued that the common law had been
changed by the fact that pari-mutuel wagering had emerged in New
York and that the taxes paid to the state form the pari-mutuels
made the racetracks agents of the state. 2 30 The court outright rejected this argument because this would mean that every licensee

224. See Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, Inc., 296 N.Y. 249, 253
(1947) (noting court's assumption that racetrack intended to bar "Owney" from
racetrack).
225. See id. at 250 (summarizing trial court's decision causing defendants to
appeal the judgment).
226. Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, Inc., 269 A.D. 644, 645-46 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2d Dept. 1945).
227. See id. at 646 (reversing lower court's injunction allowing Madden into
racetrack).
228. See Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, Inc., 296 N.Y. 249, 253
(1947) (explaining how this question led court to find that operators of race tracks
possess power to admit as spectators only those whom he may select, and to exclude, largely of his own volition, as long as exclusion is not based upon race,
creed, color, or national origin).
229. See id. at 254 (explaining Aqueduct's right to bar Madden).
230. See id. (noting court's explanation that "Section 9 of the Pari-Mutuel Revenue Law provides in substance that the licensee shall retain 10 % of total deposits
and pay there from 'to the state tax commission as a reasonable tax by the state for
the privilege of conducting pari-mutuel betting,' an amount equal to a certain
percentage of the total pool.").
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would be regarded as an administrative agency of the state simply
23
because he pays a tax or fee for his license. '
Madden also argued that the racetracks had been turned into
franchisees of the state, and franchisees were required to serve all
comers. 2 32 The court rejected this reasoning and found

[T]here is nothing inherent in the nature of horse racing
- clearly a form of amusement- which makes operation of
a race track the performance of a public function. If
plaintiffs assumption were valid, it would follow that the
mere fact of licensing makes the purpose a public one and
23 3
the license in effect a franchise.
Moreover, the court found that by authorizing Aqueduct to be
a licensed racetrack, the state did not grant Aqueduct a right that it
did not have under common law. 23 4 The ability to conduct horse

racing for stakes did exist at common law, and the license, "instead
of creating a privilege, merely permits the exercise of one restricted
' 2 35
and regulated by statute."

Courts in other states echoed the Marrone-Maddenrationale. In
Maryland, a fan was ejected from Pimlico Racetrack with no reason
given, and the fan brought suit against the racetrack. 2 36 Pimlico

was basically in the same position as Aqueduct in Madden. The
plaintiff argued that Wood, which had been the basis for the Marrone
decision, had been overruled. 23 7 Accordingly, the plaintiff maintained that the "rule followed in the Marrone case (and subsequent
American cases) is archaic and should be abandoned."'2

38

The

court disagreed with the plaintiff and found specifically that the
2 39
rule was not archaic.
231. See id. at 254 (emphasizing how court views racetrack owners no differently than licensees, theatre managers, cab drivers, liquor dealers, and dog
owners).
232. See id. at 254-55 (explaining plaintiff's argument that racetracks were
franchisees of state).
233. Id. at 255.
234. See id. (emphasizing that there is no public function in conducting
racetracks).
235. Id. at 256.
236. See Greenfield v. Maryland Jockey Club, 190 Md. 96, 100 (1948) (maintaining defendant refused to give plaintiff any reason for ejecting him or denying
him admission).
237. See id. at 101 (explaining plaintiff's position that Wood had been
overruled).
238. Id. at 101.
239. See id. at 102 ("The rule that, except in cases of common carriers, innkeepers and similar public callings, one may choose his customers is not archaic.").
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The plaintiff also argued that pari-mutuel betting was only allowed in Maryland as a special public franchise. 2 40 According to
the plaintiff, pari-mutuel betting had been illegal at common law,
and since it was a franchise, the racetrack was required to serve and
admit all prospective customers. 24 1 The Maryland Court of Ap-

peals, found, again much like the New York Court of Appeals, that
betting was not criminal under common law and instead, the licensing system of horse racing in Maryland had created "a minutely regulated, heavily taxed business in which private rights and
responsibility have not been wholly extinguished. '' 242 The licensing
and regulation of horse racing did not turn racetracks from private
carriers to public carriers, thereby allowing a racetrack the freedom
243
to choose who could be admitted to its grounds.
A very similar decision was issued by the Supreme Court of
New Jersey in Garifine v. Monmouth ParkJockey Club.24 4 The plaintiff
was excluded from Monmouth Park based on the racetrack's general assertion that "the defendant advised him that he is not wanted
at the race track and that his general record and reputation warrant
his exclusion.

' 245

On one occasion after Mr. Garifine entered Mon-

mouth Park, he was arrested and brought to trial, unsuccessfully, on
the charge of being a disorderly person. He sued Monmouth Park
"for malicious prosecution, false arrest, and deprivation of his right
246
to attend the track."

Garifine argued that he had the right under the common law
to be admitted to the race track and that New Jersey's civil rights
law also authorized his admission. 247 The court unanimously disagreed with Garifine's argument, finding under Marrone, Madden,
Greenfield, and theater admission cases that the common law al240. See id. (presenting plaintiff's view that pari-mutuel betting allowed by Maryland created public franchise).
241. See id. (articulating plaintiff's argument that pari-mutuel betting created
public franchise and therefore facilities can be used by public).
242. Id. at 104.
243. See id. at 105 (expressing court's holding that "Licensing, regulation and
taxation of a private carrier do not make it a common carrier.").
244. See Garifine v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club, 29 N.J. 47 (1959) (describing plaintiffs request for relief against his exclusion and expulsion from Monmouth Park race track).
245. Id. at 57.
246. Id. at 49 (explaining all counts, other than malicious prosecution, were
dismissed).
247. See id. at 50 (noting common law and civil rights claims of plaintiff). The
plaintiff argued he had common law fights here despite the holding of the former
New Jersey Supreme Court in Shubert v. Nixon Amusement Co., 83 A. 369 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1912).
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lowed a proprietor to ban patrons without reasonable cause. 2 48
Horse racing was a place of public amusement, not a public calling
'2 49
requiring "the duty to serve the public without discrimination.
The plaintiff offered no case law that supported authorization of his
admission, and his assertion that Monmouth Park held a state monopoly was not sufficient to turn Monmouth Park into a public calling. 250 The court also found nothing in NewJersey's civil rights law
citing a general right of admission to places of public accommoda251
tion or amusement.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court also found that the common law rule of Marrone governed a patron exclusion case. 2 52 In
Tamelleo v.New HampshireJockey Club, Rockingham Park excluded a
group of patrons because "their presence was inconsistent with the
orderly and proper conduct of a race meeting."' 253 The plaintiffs
argued that there is no common-law right in New Hampshire to
operate a pari-mutuel race track, and, if there is, the state does not
recognize the common-law rule of allowing a proprietor of a private
254
enterprise to discriminate without cause among his patrons.
The court agreed that there was no common law right to run a
pari-mutuel race track, but that was not the decisive issue. 255 The
track was still a private enterprise, and there was "no doubt that this
state [adhered] to the general rule that the proprietors of a private
248. See id. at 50-51 (pointing out that precedent did not support plaintiffs
claim). "[O]perators of most businesses, including places of amusement such as
race tracks, have never been placed under any such common-law obligation ....
Id. at 50.
249. Id. at 50. Precedent indicates that horse racing did not fall within the
public calling category. See id.
250. See id. at 57 ("The burden of the plaintiff's present attack is on the common-law doctrine which he states should be altered to afford to him a right of
admission to the race track... We are satisfied that.., there has been no showing
made here for such alteration."). Additionally, the New Jersey Racing Commission's rules "say nothing about any individual patron's right to admission [to race
tracks], but they do provide that [its] Association conducting the race meeting
shall police its grounds and shall eject 'persons believed to be bookmakers' along
with other undesirables." Id.
251. See id.
at 57-60 (describing NewJersey Civil Rights Act). "Since the plaintiff does not suggest that his exclusion was based on race, creed, color, national
origin or ancestry we find the Civil Rights Act to be inapplicable." Id. at 60.
252. See Tamelleo v. N.H. Jockey Club, 102 N.H. 547, 549 (1960) (applying
Marrone precedent instead of that cited by plaintiffs).
253. Id. at 547.
254. See id. at 548 (describing argument of plaintiffs). The defendant conceded there was no common-law right in New Hampshire "to operate a race track
where pari-mutuel pools are sold." Id.
255. See id. at 548 ("The business is still a private enterprise since it is affected
by no such public interest as to make it a public calling as is a railroad for
example.").
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calling possess the common-law right to admit or exclude whomsoever they choose." 256 Thus, the track acted within its rights in excluding the plaintiffs. 2 57 All of these opinions show that even fifty

years after Marrone had been decided, it remained good law in
common law states.
F.

Post Warren Court Licensee Exclusions in State Courts

The civil rights suits brought by racing licensees were most
commonly brought in federal courts. Nonetheless, many states
have sought to protect licensees in horse racing not by making findings of state action but by making changes in the statutes and rules
governing the powers of race tracks. 258 A number of states have
enacted statutes that require that race tracks have just cause to exclude a licensee from a race track. 25 9 Others allow excluded licensees an appeal to the state racing commission to contest the
exclusion, 2m° and some specify the grounds required for any
26 1
exclusion.
256. Id. at 549.
257. See id. at 550 (indicating holding of court consistent with precedent).
258. For more information on these statutory alterations, see infra notes 259261 and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9(e) (West 2000) ("The power to
eject or exclude an occupation licensee or other individual may be exercised for
just cause by the licensee or the Board, subject to subsequent hearing by the Board
as to the propriety of said exclusion.").
260. See, e.g.,
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 19573 (West 2010) (describing procedure for appeal after exclusion from race track in California); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 4:192 (2009) (indicating right of hearing for any person excluded from race
track in Louisiana); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 128A, § 10A (West 2010) (noting
requirement for post-exclusion hearing in Massachusetts); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 240.27 (West 2010) (providing requirement of hearing in Minnesota); see also
Evans v. Ark. Racing Comm'n, 606 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Ark. 1980) (implying plaintiffs right to appeal).
261. See, e.g.,
230 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9(e) (West 2000) (explaining that
"licensee or any other individual whose conduct or reputation is such that his presence may... call into question the honesty and integrity of horse racing or wagering or interfere with the orderly conduct of horse racing or wagering" may be
excluded from tracks in Illinois); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 19572 (West 2008)
(allowing exclusion of "known bookmaker[s]" or "any other person whose presence in the inclosure would ...be inimical to the interests of the state or of
legitimate horse racing" in California); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4.193 (2009) (outlining categories of persons who may be excluded in Louisiana); MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 128A, § 10A (West 2010) (permitting exclusion of "any person whose
presence ... is detrimental" may be excluded from race tracks in Massachusetts);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 240.27 (West 2010) (indicating who may be excluded from
race tracks in Minnesota); 4 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 325.215 (West 2010) (permitting exclusion of "any person whose presence there is ... inconsistent with the
orderly or proper conduct of a race meeting or whose presence or conduct is
deemed detrimental to the best interest of horse racing" in Pennsylvania); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 41-3-17 (2009) (stating that "any person whose presence within the
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Nonetheless, in those states where the common law still governs licensee exclusions, Marrone, as a general rule, is still the
law. 262 A race track in these states can apparently exclude any licensee even without a reason. 263 While Marrone may still be the general
rule in these states, excluded parties are starting to rely on tort theories, such as tortuous interference with future economic opportunities, to limit the current effect of Marrone.
In one Ohio case, Beulah Park excluded a licensed jockey
agent without giving a reason .264 The agent brought suit against
the track, and the exclusion was upheld by the Ohio Supreme
Court. 265 Additionally, the Supreme Court found that the common
law had not been changed in Ohio because the state licensing
scheme was not intended to alter the common-law rights of a race
track. 266 The court held that, "[t] he rules and statute cited by the
appellee provide a right to exclude to the racing commission and
racing stewards, who are not addressed by the common law. This
does not mean that race track owners who possessed this right at
common law have lost that right due to rules and statutes providing
26 7
the same right to others.
enclosure is ... undesirable" may be excluded in Rhode Island); see also Evans v.
Ark. Racing Comm'n, 606 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Ark. 1980) (describing and upholding
statute under which "any person who ... has acted to the detriment of racing or
violated the rules" may be excluded in Arkansas).
262. Because it was decided by the Supreme Court, Marrone is binding precedent on those states that have not statutorily altered the common law regarding
licensee exclusions. See Marrone v. Wash. Jockey Club of D.C., 227 U.S. 633
(1913).
263. See id. at 636-37 (indicating that ticket was license subject to revocation).
Marronedoes not specify whether any justification must be given for an exclusion,
so it seems that states following the case need notjustify removing someone from a
race track. See id.
264. See Bresnik v. Beulah Park Ltd. P'ship, 617 N.E.2d 1096, 1097 (Ohio
1993) (holding horse racing park has common law right to exclude whomever it
wants from its premises, despite lack of such language in statutory code). The facts
simply indicated that "[o]n February 3, 1991, [plaintiff] was informed by a security
officer that he was no longer permitted on the grounds of Beulah Park." Id.
265. See id. at 1098 (reversing appellate court's holding in favor of appellee
jockey agent).
266. See id. ("Beulah Park possesses the common-law right to exclude whomsoever it pleases, provided the General Assembly has not abolished that right.").
The agent had argued that the overall licensing scheme in Ohio had changed the
common law by giving the "State Racing Commission plenary power over the regulation of horse racing." Id. at 1099 (Sweeney, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 1098. The dissent espoused the position that the statutory scheme
had altered the common law and that the effect of the majority decision was to
make the race track operator the "judge,jury and executioner to anyone who enters its grounds, regardless of whether such person is licensed to be there by the
State Racing Commission." Id. at 1100 (Sweeney, J., dissenting).
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Such an opinion was echoed by the New Jersey courts in determining that patrons have broad rights to enter places of public
amusement, but those rights do not apply to licensees. 268 In
Marzocca v. Ferone, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that Freehold Raceway had the right to exclude a licensed owner's horse
from its track. 269 The court found that the common law right to
exclude governs in the case of people "who have a business relation2 70
ship with the race tracks."
Similarly, in New York State, the courts have generally found
that a private race track retains its common law authority to exclude
licensees. 2 71 Arone v. Sullivan County Harness Racing Association held
that race tracks, apart from the New York Racing Association
(NYRA), retained their right to exclude licensees. 2 72 In Arone, Monticello Raceway "had available to it the long-recognized prerogative
of race track operators to exclude anyone from its track, without

cause, provided the exclusion is not based on race, creed, color or
national origin." 273 Courts in non-NYRA cases have continued to

hold that the common law allows the race track to right to exclude
2 74
licensees.
268. See Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 371 (N.J. 1982) (holding Casino Control Act precludes gambling resorts from excluding patron for card
counting). But see Marzocca v. Ferone, 461 A.2d 1133, 1134 (N.J. 1983) (reversing
appellate court and holding that race track had "an unfettered right to exclude").
269. See Marzocca, 461 A.2d at 1134-35 (considering common law right in context of exclusion of race horses from race tracks).
270. Id. at 1136. "[W]e hold that the racetrack's common law right to exclude exists in the context of this case, i.e., where 'the relationship [is] between the
track management and persons who wish to perform their vocational activities on
the track premises.'" Id. at 1137 (citation omitted). See generally Brennan v. N.J.
Sports & Exposition Auth., No. A-4765-98T1, 1999 N.J. Super. LEXIS 168, at *1
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 6, 1999) (holding that race track run by public
entity should have no broader authority than race track run by private entity to
determine who may engage in horse racing at its track).
271. SeeArone v. Sullivan County Harness Racing Ass'n, 457 N.Y.S.2d 958, 959
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (implying that plaintiff's rights were not violated because
they were not denied entry to other tracks in New York).
272. See id. (indicating that race track could exclude patrons without cause
due to lack of monopoly). NYRA had a virtual monopoly on thoroughbred racing.
See id. Thus, because other tracks were not available to patrons who had been
excluded, NYRA was barred from banning patrons withoutjustification. SeeJacobson v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 305 N.E.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. 1973).
273. Arone, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
274. See Ferraro v. Finger Lakes Racing Ass'n, 583 N.Y.S.2d 66, 67 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1992) (holding defendant's exclusion of plaintiffs from its race track was motivated by legitimate business interests and not for improper reasons); Hendrickson
v. Saratoga Harness Racing, Inc., 565 N.Y.S.2d 610, 611 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (concluding that plaintiffs merits claim against defendant private race track owner was
unlikely to succeed, resulting in exclusion being upheld); Wilsey v. Saratoga Harness Racing Inc., 528 N.Y.S.2d 688, 689-90 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (reiterating mes-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol17/iss2/7

40

Liebman: The Supreme Court and Exclusions by Racetracks
2010]

EXCLUSIONS BY RACETRACKS

Florida has also allowed its race tracks to exclude licensees. 275
In Calder Race Course, Inc. v. Gaitan, the race track denied a trainer
access to horse stalls. 276 The trainer pointed to a Florida racing
commission regulation that stated that the track had to allocate
horse stalls to trainers. 2 77 The court did not regard this regulation
as depriving the race track of its exclusionary powers; instead, it
found that "[u] ntil the Florida Legislature acts or private racing establishments disparage constitutionally guaranteed rights, they continue to have the right to choose those persons with whom they
278
wish to do business."
Nevertheless, the common law is still subject to a number of
limitations. One limitation exists where the racetrack has a de facto
monopoly over horse racing. In Jacobson v. New York Racing Ass'n,
the New York Court of Appeals placed a 'justification" standard on
licensee exclusions made by the NYRA. 2 79 NYRA was one of two
licensed thoroughbred racing associations in New York, and it ran
the dates in the New York metropolitan area and at the prestigious
thoroughbred meet in Saratoga Springs. 28 0 The only other racing
28
association, Finger Lakes, ran a far smaller meet than the NYRA.
Based on NYRA's virtual monopoly over thoroughbred racing, the
court found that "[e]xclusion from its tracks is tantamount to barring the plaintiff from virtually the only places in the State where he
may ply his trade and, in practical effect, may infringe on the State's
power to license horsemen." 28 2 As a result, the decision to exclude
had to be a "reasonable discretionary business judgment." 283 The
burden would be on the excluded party to show that the decision to
sage of other two relevant holdings that plaintiff has heavy burden to overcome
race track's common law right to exclude).
275. See Calder Race Course Inc. v. Gaitan, 393 So. 2d 15, 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (finding private race track owners Florida can choose whom to exclude
as long as not done for unconstitutional reasons).
276. See id. at 15 (detailing factual background of plaintiffs lawsuit). The parties conceded that Gaitan had "no contractual right to the use of the horse stalls."

Id.
277. See id. at 16 (explaining legal basis for plaintiff trainer's lawsuit against
defendant race track).

278. Id.
279. SeeJacobson v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 305 N.E.2d 765,767 (N.Y. 1973) (holding defendant racing association, having monopoly on thoroughbred horse racing
in New York, did not have absolute right to exclude whomever it wanted).
280. See id. at 767 (explaining why court determined that NYRA was

monopoly).
281. See id. at 768, n. * (showing racing association with significantly less market power).

282. Id. at 768.
283. Id.
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exclude was not based on "motives other than those relating to the
284
best interests of racing generally."
The Jacobson reasoning was very similar to that of the California

court of appeals' reasoning in Greenberg v. Hollywood Turf Club.28 5 A

thoroughbred racetrack had excluded the plaintiff, who was a licensed trainer and stable agent.286 The court found that the race-

track had a quasi-monopoly over racing and had to have a
justification for its decision to exclude the plaintiff.287 Similar rea-

soning was employed by the appellate court of Illinois in Cox v. NationalJockey Club.288 The court found that a racing association as a
quasi-monopoly licensee of the state "cannot arbitrarily deny a licensed jockey permission to participate in its racing meet." 289 Ex-

clusion would be allowed where a "legitimate and reasonable
justification for exclusion is articulated."' 290 Apart from "quasi-monopoly" the New Jersey Supreme Court in Marzocca added its own
modification. 291 The court noted that any licensee justification
could not violate public policy.29 2 It simply stated a limit on "the

common law doctrine by proscribing exclusions that violate public
293

policy."
Further, there are restrictions on the common law right to ex-

clude, which are derived from tort law principles. 294 One tort law
limitation involves the tort of defamation. 295 A racetrack, even
while acting within its rights to exclude an individual, could not
284. See id. (alleging what needs to be proved).

285. See Greenberg v. Hollywood Turf Club, 86 Cal. Rptr. 885 (Cal. Ct. App.
1970) (noting that race tracks do not need absolute immunity from providing reasons for excluding certain trainers from their grounds, even to protect legitimate
business interests).
286. See id. at 887 (providing factual background for plaintiff trainer's complaint against defendant race track).
287. See id. at 890-91 (holding quasi-monopoly prevented defendant race
track from having absolute power to exclude people for any reason).
288. SeeCox v. Nat'lJockey Club, 323 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1974)
(comparing reasoning of case with Greenburg case).
289. Id. at 164.
290. Id. at 166 (explaining when exclusion would be fine under quasi monopolies). Illinois law on exclusion is now covered by statute. See id.
291. See Marzocca v. Ferone, 461 A.2d 1133 (NJ. 1983) (discussing requirements for licensee justification).
292. See id. at 517 (noting courts disdain with state law).
293. Id. In some ways this may have been akin to the language in Martin,
which suggested that an "exclusion may not be without justification." Martin v.
Monmouth Park Jockey Club, 145 F. Supp. 439, 441 (D.NJ. 1956).
294. See generally Wilsey v. Saratoga Harness Racing, 140 A.D.2d 857 (N.Y.
App. Div. 3d Dep't 1988) (showing tort based case).
295. See generally id. (illustrating tort case of defamation).
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defame that individual. 29 6 Nonetheless, there do not appear to be
any successful defamation cases brought against racetrack that ex297
cluded an individual.
In addition, tort law limits on common law licensee exclusions
include the torts of interference with existing contracts, prima facie
torts, and interference with a prospective economic advantage. 29
In Greenberg v. Hollywood Turf Club, the excluded licensee maintained that the racetrack had caused a breach in his existing contract and had intentionally interfered with his "prospective
economic advantage by preventing his negotiations with other
trainers and horse owners in the stable area ...."299 The racetrack
30 0
argued that its common law right to exclude governed the issue.
The court disagreed, however, finding that "the general principle
that a party whose conduct causes legal injury should justify himself,
applies here as well."' 0 '
In Ferraro,two excluded trainers argued that their exclusion by
the racetrack interfered with their existing contract and that their
exclusions constituted a prima facie tort.30 2 Since there was no

proof that the racetrack knew about any existing contracts or procured their breach, they could not have been guilty of interference
with any existing contracts. 30 3 On the prima facie tort issue, the
court described the issue as one involving" 1) the intentional infliction of harm, 2) which results in special damages, 3) without any
excuse or justification, 4) by an act or series of acts which would
otherwise be lawful."3 4 In Ferraro, there was justification since
nothing in the record indicated that the racetrack had an improper
or malicious motive to exclude the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs had
failed to show that there were any triable issues of fact on the question of motive. 30 5 While the excluded parties were unsuccessful in
Ferraro, the case does seem to imply that a decision to exclude a
296. See id. (exemplifying unsuccessful defamation case).
297. See Wilsey v. Saratoga Harness Racing, 140 A.D.2d 857 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d
Dep't 1988); Ferraro v. Finger Lakes Facing Ass'n, 182 A.D.2d 1072 (N.Y. App. Div.
4th Dep't 1992) (granting summary judgment against defamation claim).
298. See generally Greenberg v. Hollywood Turf Club, 7 Cal. App. 3d 968 (Cal.
App. 2d Dist. 1970) (depicting tort law limits on licensee exclusions in common

law).
299. Id. at 973.
300. See id. at 976 (presenting racetrack's arguments).

301. Id. at 978.
302. See Ferraro,182 A.D.2d at 1072.
303. See id. (discussing court's view on racetrack's argument).

304. Id.
305. See id. (declaring presence of proper justification).
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licensed party made with malice or improper motive could face lia30 6
bility in New York for a prima facie tort.

Perhaps the clearest example of an excluded party claiming
tortuous interference with future economic opportunities is the
case involving Michael Gill and Delaware Park. 30 7 Thoroughbred
owner Michael Gill was excluded by the thoroughbred racetrack
Delaware Park. 30 8 He brought a wide variety of claims against the
racetrack in federal court in Delaware including a claim that Delaware Park and two defendant trainers who regularly raced at Delaware Park had committed the tort of interference with an
advantageous business relationship. 30 9 The court, applying Delaware law found that the tort had four elements including:
(1) the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on
the part of the interferer; (3) intentional interference
which induces or causes a breach or termination of the
relationship or expectancy; and (4) resulting damages to
the party whose relationship or expectancy has been
3 10
disrupted.
The plaintiff claimed that the actions of the racetrack in excluding him and the trainers from Delaware Park by recommending exclusion interfered with his ability to obtain future
trainers for his horses and also made it impossible for him race
there and to obtain stall space at other tracks in the Mideast. 3 11
The defendants argued that the racetracks had the right to exclude
Gill under common law.3

12

The court instead found,

The defendants miss the point. Plaintiff's argument is
that the defendants interfered with his business expectancy in racing at Delaware Park, by improperly influencing Delaware Park's decision to not permit plaintiff to rent
stalls or to race horses at the track. If true, that conduct is
actionable under Delaware law and the existence of such a
306. See id. (demonstrating implied liability for improper motive or malice).
307. See Gill v. Del. Park, 294 F. Supp. 2d 638 (D. Del. 2003) (showing tortuous interference with future economic opportunities).
308. See id. at 642.
309. See id. at 645.
310.
238, 243
311.
312.

Id. at 645 (citing Lucent Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lucent Techs., 5 F. Supp. 2d
(D. Del. 1998) (noting elements of advantageous business relationship).
See id. at 642 (setting forth Plaintiffs claims).
See id. at 645 (countering Plaintiffs claims with Defendant's arguments).
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business expectancy is a question of fact not suitable for
313
resolution at this time.

The court further ruled that issue, of whether the actions taken
by the defendants affected Gill's business expectancy at the nonDelaware tracks, was "a question of fact not suitable to resolution at
this time."3 14 In short, the common law ability to exclude a licensee
did not by itself give a racetrack (or people conspiring with racetracks) any immunity from the tort of interference with an advantageous business relationship.

3 15

From these opinions it is apparent that while the common law
rule, derived from Marrone, still has significant application to exclusion of licensees in horse racing, its prominence is beginning to
fade. The emergence of tort theories of liability is now impinging
on a racetrack's exclusionary rights, and even in common law
states, it is likely that a racetrack now needs a reasonable justification before it can exclude any licensee.
G.

Post Warren Court Patron Exclusions in State Courts

Under common law, the significance of the Marrone decision
may be waning in the area of licensee exclusions, but it remains
virtually dominant in the realm of patron exclusions. As a general
rule, except for those few states that have abrogated the common
law, the rule of Man-one still prevails. There are only a few states
where Marronehas been modified by strictly judicial action.3 16 Only
three states, California, Massachusetts, and Minnesota, have clearly
modified the common law rule for patron exclusions.3 17 For a time
it had been ruled that the statute on exclusions in Rhode Island
had altered the law on patron exclusions, but that statute was subse3 18
quently amended and restored the common law.

313. Id. at 645-46.
314. Id. at 646.
315. See generally id. (portraying general law of case).
316. For further discussion see infra text accompanying notes 317-318.
317. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 19572-19573 (portraying modification of
common law rule for patron exclusions); 4 CCR §§ 1980 & 1989 (departing from
common law rule for patron exclusions); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. 128A, § 10A
(West 2009) (depicting adjustment of common law rule for patron exclusions);
MINN. STAT. § 240.27 (showing alteration of common law rule for patron exclusions); see also Catrone v. State Racing Comm'n, 459 N.E.2d 474 (Mass. App. Ct.
1984), appeal denied, 462 N.E.2d 1374 (Mass. 1984) (demonstrating application of
modified rule for patron exclusions).
318. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 41-3-17 (establishing amended statute reflecting
common law rule on patron exclusions); P.L. 1981 ch. 426 §1 (reflecting departure from common law rule); P.L. 1997 ch. 326 §146 (illustrating departure from
common law rule).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010

45

466

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 7
SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 17: p. 421

VILLovA

Pennsylvania is similar to Rhode Island in that it once seemed
the common law had been altered, but it now is in command. It
had been held in Rockwell v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission that Pennsylvania had abrogated the common law rule as it affected patrons. 319 Nevertheless, in Staino v. Commonwealth the court
ruled that Pennsylvania racetracks, pursuant to a statute amended
after Rockwell, had an unlimited right to exclude patrons. 320 In
Staino, the patron was ejected by Keystone Race Track. 32 1 The patron then appealed to the Racing Commission, which affirmed the
ejection. 3 22 The patron claimed that tracks in Pennsylvania were
required to provide patrons with due process before they could be
denied their constitutional right to attend the track. 32 3 The court
rejected all of the patron's arguments and found that the statute
authorizing patron ejections was constitutional, that there was no
state action in Keystone's actions and that patron had no cognizable constitutional rights. 3 24 Finally, the court ruled that the racing
commission did not even have to hold a hearing in order to uphold
Keystone's ejection of the patron. 325 The racing commission would
only have to review the ejection if the patron had alleged that Keystone excluded him because of his membership in a protected
class. 326 The court determined that a track "has carte blanche to

eject a patron without cause except that it may not eject a patron
because of the patron's race, color, creed, sex, national origin, or
religion. ''3 27 The court found "the statute is unambiguous in its affirmation of the licensed corporation's right to eject Mr. Staino, a
patron, from Keystone Race Track without cause. 32 8
While Pennsylvania law remains clear, the law in Louisiana still
continues to be uncertain. Louisiana has a statute which on its face
appears to apply to patrons and lists categories of persons who may
319. See Rockwell v. Pa. State Horse Racing Comm'n, 327 A.2d 211, 214 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1974) (discussing holding of case).
320. See Staino v. Commonwealth, 512 A.2d 75 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (stating holding of case); see also Race Horse Industry Reform Act (Act), 4 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 325.101-325.402 (1981).
321. See Staino, at 75-76 (summarizing case facts).
322. See id. at 76 (outlining posture of case).
323. See id. (discussing patrons claims).
324. See id. at 78-79 (declaring constitutionality of patron ejection).
325. See id. at 79 (asserting no hearing is needed to uphold patron's ejection).
326. See id. at 78 (requiring review of ejection if exclusion caused by patron's
membership within protected class).
327. Id. at 76.
328. Id. at 77.
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be excluded from a racetrack. 329 The statute asserts that the racing
commission shall promulgate rules creating the categories of persons who may be excluded from a racetrack. 33 0 The categories to
be established by the racing commission must include, but are not
limited to, five categories noted within the statute: underage persons, felons, career or professional offenders, people of notorious
reputation, and people who have lost or been refused a racing license.3 3 1 The racing commission has implemented the five
33 2
mandatory categories and also added two additional categories.
These new classifications enable racetracks to exclude individuals
who have behaved improperly or obnoxiously at a racetrack or
whose action or inaction at a racetrack would interfere with the or3 33
derly business of the track.
Louisiana courts have been unanimous in finding that the statutes took away the power of the tracks to exclude licensees suggesting this section would apply to patrons and limit the right of
Louisiana tracks to exclude patrons according to the commission'g
329. See La. R.S. ch. 4 §193 (detailing categories of persons subject to
exclusions).
330. See id.
A. The commission shall adopt and promulgate rules and regulations
establishing categories of persons who may be excluded or ejected
from a track, race meeting, race, or licensed establishment. Such categories shall include, but shall not be limited to, categories of
persons:
(1) Who are not of age.
(2) Who have been convicted of a felony under the laws of the
United States, this state or any other state or country, or any
crime or offense involving moral turpitude.
(3) Who are career or professional offenders as defined by regulation of the commission.
(4) Who are of notorious or unsavory reputation or whose presence,
in the opinion of the commission, would be inimical to the state
of Louisiana and its citizens or to the track, meeting, race, or
licensed establishment, or to both.
(5) Who have had a license or permit refused, suspended or withdrawn under R.S. 4:152.
B. No person may be excluded or ejected on account of race, color,
creed, national origin, ancestry, disability, as defined in R.S.
51:2232(11), or gender.
C. No permittee in good standing shall be denied access to or racing
privileges at any racing facility except in accordance with the rules of
the Louisiana State Racing Commission.
Id.
331. See id. (establishing categories of individuals to be statutorily excluded
from racetracks in Louisiana).
332. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 1801 (2009) (stating rule adopted and
meant to be applied pursuant to R.S. ch. 4§§ 192-193).
333. See id. (providing additional two categories for expulsion at racetracks).
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established categoires.3 34 Nevertheless, in Sims v. Jefferson Downs
Racing Association the Fifth Circuit stated in dicta that:
The proprietary rights of the racetrack are limited by this
rule only with respect to permittees. The 1981 amendment preserved the proprietary rights of the racetrack
with respect to others, because § 2 of Acts of 1981, No.
779, which amended Title 4, Chapter 4, provided: 'Nothing contained in the provisions of this Act should in anyway affect or be construed to limit or modify the
proprietary rights of any owner of any establishment licensed to operate or conduct any exotic wagering or pari33 5
mutuel wagering or pools.'
The Louisiana Supreme Court in a subsequent case, which
dealt with licensees and not patrons, declined to address the specific contention on patrons raised in the Sims case. 336 The court
said, "Although Sims suggests that R.S. 4:193(C) limits the proprietary rights of racetracks only with respect to permittees and that the
1981 amendment, 1981 Acts, No. 779 § 2, preserved the proprietary
rights of the racetrack with respect to others, we do not reach that
3 37
question since it is beyond the scope of the issue before us."
Unlike Louisiana, common law states uphold the rule of total
management discretion in patron exclusions, which remains the
law. 338 One recent example is found in Village of North Randall v.
Offenburgerwhere a patron appealed a criminal trespassing conviction. 339 In the case, Thistledown security advised the patron, who
had a betting dispute that if he did not return certain alleged overpayments, he would not be allowed on the track.3 40 Additionally,
management informed the patron that if he returned to the track
334. But see Sims v. Jefferson Downs Racing Ass'n, 778 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir.
1985) (acknowledging proprietary fights of racetrack are limited with respect to
permittees).
335. Id. at 1076 n.5, (citing Fox v. La. State Racing Comm'n, 433 So. 2d 1123
(La. Ct. App. 1983).
336. See Wolf v. La. State Racing Comm'n, 545 So. 2d 976 (La. 1989) (holding
that conditioning race participation on execution of agreement violated jockeys'
rights as licensed permittees of La. State Racing Commission).
337. Id. at 979.
338. See, e.g., Vill. of N. Randall v. Offenburger, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1587,
at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 14, 1994) (noting rule of total management discretion in
patron exclusions as law).
339. See id.(recounting case facts).
340. See id. at *2 (stating basis of patron's exclusion from track).
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without paying the money, he would be arrested. 34 1 The patron
failed to follow these commands and on a return visit to the track
he was arrested. 342 Disputing the arrest, the patron argued that the
track was a place of public accommodation open to all, and that
only the Ohio Racing Commission could eject patrons. 34 3 The

court reviewed the Ohio precedents, ultimately finding that under
the common law rule there was no general right to be admitted to a
344
racetrack.
Patron exclusions based on the Marrone common law theory
have been upheld in Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, and New York.3

45

Accordingly, where the common law gov-

erns, there have only been two instances where courts have
imposed restrictions on the common law right to exclude patrons.3 4 6 One such instance was in Tamelleo v. New HampshireJockey
Club.347 In so holding the court asserted: "We interpret that part of

the statute which allows the defendant licensee to exercise its 'sole
judgment' to mean that the judgment cannot be exercised in a capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable manner."3 48 The greater threat
to the common law right to exclude patrons came in Uston v. Resorts
341. See id. (asserting patron recieved written notice "informing him that if he
returned to the racetrack he would be arrested for trespassing).
342. See id. (detailing arrest of patron).
343. See id. at *5 ("Authority to eject patrons from a race track rests solely with
the Ohio Racing Commission . . . accordingly, [race track] did not have the authority to eject....").
344. See id. at *7 (clarifying patron's privilege to be at racetrack was revoked
therefore track was within its common law right to exclude patron from premises).
345. See Silbert v. Ramsey, 482 A.2d 147 (Md. 1984) (allowing racetrack to
exclude patron from attending races); James v. Churchill Downs, Inc., 620 S.W.2d
323 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (finding common law right to exclude patrons from racetrack); Tropical Park, Inc. v.Jock, 374 So. 2d 639 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1979)
(upholding exclusions in racetracks found in common law); Nation v. Apache
Greyhound Park, Inc., 579 P.2d 580 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (following common law
exclusions); People v. Licata, 268 N.E.2d 787 (N.Y. 1971) (denying defendant from
racetrack after being convicted of bookmaking); Griffin v. Southland Racing
Corp., 370 S.W.2d 429 (Ark. 1963) (permitting common law exclusions); In re
Saumell v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 447 N.E.2d 706, 709 (N.Y. 1983) ("Nor is there anything... to suggest that the Legislature intended to pre-empt NYRA's common-law
power of exclusion."); In re Presti v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 46 A.D.2d 387 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1975) (excluding racing broker from racetrack); In reVaintraub v.
N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 28 A.D.2d 660 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1967) (holding that
race track may exclude people except for face, color or national origin).
346. See Tamelleo v. N.H. Jockey Club, Inc., 163 A.2d 10 (N.H. 1960) (placing
limits on liscensee's right to exclude patrons); Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc.,
445 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1982) (restricting licensee's exclusion power).
347. See Tamelleo, 163 A.2d at 10 (holding bill in equity valid allowing proprietors of race tracks to admit or exclude anyone they choose and statute valid authorizing licensee of racetrack to exclude any person within sole judgment of licensee).
348. Id. at 13.
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InternationalHotel, Inc. 349 In this case, Kenneth Uston, a blackjack

player, who was renowned for his card counting abilities had been
banned from Resorts International Hotel's blackjack tables. 350 The
New Jersey Casino Control Commission who promulgated the
blackjack rules, however, had no regulations on the exclusion of
card counters. 351 Citing the common law exclusion cases, the Casino Control Commission confirmed the exclusion.3

52

The New

Jersey Supreme Court found for Uston because he had not violated
any of the Commission's rules.3 53 In addition, the court felt "constrained to refute any implication arising from the Commission's
opinion that, absent supervening statutes, the owners of public accommodations enjoy an absolute right to exclude patrons without
good cause.

3

54

The court went on to find that both the views of the casino and
the Commission were incorrect as these views pertained to the common law, forgetting common law's right of reasonable access to
public places. 355 The court found that the absolute right of exclu3 56
sion in NewJersey had been narrowed by several court decisions.
The effect of this narrowing of common law was:
[T]hat when property owners open their premises to the
general public in the pursuit of their own property interests, they have no right to exclude people unreasonably.
On the contrary, they have a duty not to act in an arbitrary
or discriminatory manner toward persons who come on
349. See Uston 445 A.2d at 370 (noting threat to common law right to exclude

patrons).
350. See id. at 371 (explaining strategy of card counting tilted odds in favor of

patron under promulgated blackjack rules).
351. See id. at 373 (arguing exhaustive statutes made clear Casino Control
Commission's control over rules and conduct of licensed casino was intended to
be comprehensive therefore, Uston's gaming was "conducted according to rules

promulgated by the Commission").
352. See id. at 372-73, (disagreeing with Casino Control Commission's choice
upholding Resorts' exclusion decision under common law right to exclude).
353. See id. at 375 ("[A] bsent a valid [Casino Control] Commission regulation
excluding card counters excluding card counters, respondent Uston will be free to

employ his card counting strategy at Resorts' blackjack tables.").
354. See id. at 372 ("We hold that the common law right to exclude is substan-

tially limited by a competing common law right of reasonable access to public
places.").
355. See id. at 374 ("At one time an absolute right of exclusion prevailed"
however, "common law has evolved" and "the more private property is devoted to
public use, the more it must accommodate the rights which inhere in individual

members of the general public who used that property.").

356. See id. at 374-75 (discussing precedent that narrowed right to exclude in

public places).
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their premises. That duty applies not only to common carriers.

. .

but to all property owners who open their prem-

ises to the public. Property owners have no legitimate
interest in unreasonably excluding particular members of
the public when they open their premises for public
357
use.
The court found that, under its concept of the common law,
the casino did have some rights to exclude patrons. 3 58 It could exclude disorderly and disruptive people as well as people who
threaten the security of the premises. 359 The court specifically
noted that the casino would have the right to exclude "the disorderly, the intoxicated, and the repetitive petty offender."' 360 Therefore suggesting that the casino's decision to exclude must be
reasonable. 6 1 Because Uston was neither a security threat nor a
disruptive influence, the casino had no common law right to exclude him.3 62 Instead, Uston had a right of reasonable access to the
casino. 363 A short time later, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in
Maizocca, refused to apply the "reasonable access" theory to
3 64

licensees.

While the opinion in Uston has received a favorable academic

3 65
reception, NewJersey remains the only state follow such a theory.
As a result, in all other states where the common law has not been

abrogated by legislative enactments, the Marrone case continues to
remain the law with respect to patrons at racetracks.3 66 The law on
patron exclusions in state courts remains largely what it was in
357. Id. at 375 (citation omitted).
358. See id.(noting casino's right to exclude patrons).
359. See id. (allowing casinos to exclude patrons who were disorderly, disruptive, or threatened security).
360. Id. (articulating specific exclusions still allowed under common law in
New Jersey).
361. See id. ("Property owners have no legitimate interest in unreasonably excluding particular members of the public when they open their premises for public use.").
362. See id. (establishing reasonability of exclusion determined on case-by-case
basis).
363. See id. (holding under circumstances and without valid contrary rules by
Commission, Uston had right of reasonable access to Resorts International's black-

jack tables).
364. See Marzocca v. Ferone, 461 A.2d 1133, 1135-37 (N.J. 1983) (discussing
right to reasonable access).

365. Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1982) (suggesting
limited application of holding in patron exclusion cases).

366. See Marrone v. Wash. Jockey Club of D.C., 227 U.S. 633, 636 (1913) (upholding patron exclusion as good law).
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1913.367 Seemingly, the courts, like Justice Holmes, "see no reason

for declining to follow the commonly accepted rule.
VIII.

368

CONCLUSION

Often when people think of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes'
place in sports law they think of FederalBaseball Club, Inc. v. National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs which provided an antitrust exemption for major league baseball.3 69 Yet the importance of this
decision has been diminished by collective bargaining agreements,
judicial decisions governing the interpretation of those agreements,
and legislative enactments.3 70 On the other hand, the effect of the
Marronedecision has certainly continued to be extremely significant
to the horse racing industry.3 71 The unlimited discretion that Marrone provided for racetracks in patron exclusion remained largely
372
unchallenged for the first five decades of the twentieth century.
Even now, the decision influences the basic law in almost all cases
involving the exclusion of patrons or individuals who hold licenses
to engage in horse racing. 373 While it may be difficult to envision

the 'Yankee from Olympus" consorting with the likes of Joseph
Marrone, Riley Grannan, Manny Greenberg, or even Coley Madden, Justice Holmes' influence on the sport cannot be denied.
Holmes decision in Marrone truly places him in the winners' circle
37 4
in terms of his influence on the sport of horse racing.
367. See id. (suggesting law concerning patron exclusions remains unchanged
since 1913).
368. Id. at 636.
369. See Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof]I Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200 (1922) (discussing case dealing with baseball antitrust).
370. See Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976) (presenting dispute between players and owners over collective bargaining agreements). See also Mitchell Nathanson, The Irrelevance of Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: A Historical Review, 58 RUTGERS L. REv. 1
(2005) (examining Major League Baseballs' antitrust exemption); Martin M.
Tomlinson, The Commissioners New Clothes: The Myth of Major League Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 255 (2008) (concentrating on antitrust exemption and split in interpretations); Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b
(2006) (reviewing application of antitrust laws to professional major league baseball); Nathaniel Grow, Reevaluating the Curt Flood Act of 1998, 87 NEB. L. REv. 747
(2009) (explaining labor relations between MLB and MLBPA).
371. See Marrone, 227 U.S. at 636 (serving as primary authority in horse
racing).
372. See id. (providing legal basis for laws regarding patron exclusions at
racetracks).
373. See id. (retaining influence within horse racing).
374. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS: JUSTICE HOLMES
An His FAMILY (1944) (addressing life of Justice Holmes).
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